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FACILITATING COMPETITION BY
REMEDIAL REGULATION
Kristelia A. García†

ABSTRACT
In music licensing, powerful music publishers have begun—for the first time ever—
to withdraw their digital copyrights from the collectives that license those rights, in order
to negotiate considerably higher rates in private deals. At the beginning of the year, two
of these publishers commanded a private royalty rate nearly twice that of the going
collective rate. This result could be seen as a coup for the free market: Constrained by
consent decrees and conflicting interests, collectives are simply not able to establish and
enforce a true market rate in the new, digital age. This could also be seen as a
pathological form of private ordering: Powerful licensors using their considerable market
power to impose a supracompetitive rate on a hapless licensee. While there is no way to
know what the market rate looks like in a highly regulated industry like music publishing,
the anticompetitive effects of these withdrawals may have detrimental consequences for
artists, licensees and consumers. In industries such as music licensing, network effects,
parallel pricing and tacit collusion can work to eliminate meaningful competition from
the marketplace. The resulting lack of competition threatens to stifle innovation in both
the affected, and related, industries.
Normally, where a market operates in a workably competitive manner, the remedy
for anticompetitive behavior can be found in antitrust law. In music licensing, however,
some concerning behaviors, including both parallel pricing and tacit collusion, do not rise
to the level of antitrust violations; as such, they cannot be addressed by antitrust law. This
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is no small irony. At one point, antitrust served as a check on the licensing collectives by
establishing consent decrees to govern behavior. Due to a series of acquisitions that have
reduced the music publishing industry to a mere three entities, the collectives that are
being circumvented by these withdrawals (and whose conduct is governed by consent
decrees) now pose less of a competitive concern than do individual publishing companies
acting privately, or in concert through tacit collusion. The case of intellectual property
rights, which defer competition for creators and inventors for a limited period of time, is
particularly challenging for antitrust.
Running contrary to conventional wisdom, this Article posits that regulation—not
antitrust—is the optimal means of enabling entry and innovation in the music licensing
market. While regulation is conventionally understood to restrict new entry and to
interfere with competition, this Article demonstrates that where a market becomes highly
concentrated, regulation can actually encourage competition by ensuring access to key
inputs at competitive rates. While not without its drawbacks, including an increase in the
cost of private action, remedial regulation in music licensing corrects anticompetitive
behavior and ensures ongoing access to content and fair payment to artists, while
supporting continued innovation in content distribution.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 30, 2015, rapper Jay-Z and a dozen of his closest artistfriends came together at a press release event in New York City to
announce a new music streaming service that was widely billed as
“revolutionary.”1 The service called Tidal was touted as artist-owned and
promised to pay artists more than any other music streaming service.
While the logistics around Tidal’s business model were foregone in favor
of star power and flashy showmanship, this much is clear: The only way
Tidal is going to command $19.99/month (twice the monthly cost of
competing services) from customers is if the participating artists—which
include Jack White, Beyoncé, Daft Punk, and Kanye West—withdraw
their content from all other music streaming services and thereby allow
Tidal to create scarcity and command a higher subscription rate.
While this reduction in the number of distribution outlets may seem
undesirable from a consumer perspective, this result is precisely what
unregulated intellectual property (IP) rights do when they protect the

1. See, e.g., Ben Sisario, Jay Z Reveals Plans for Tidal, a Streaming Music Service,
N.Y. TIMES (March 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/business/media/jay
-z-reveals-plans-for-tidal-a-streaming-music-service.html [http://perma.cc/M4ZX-CJ9W]
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rights holder from competition for a limited period of time.2 The real
concern, and the subject of this Article, is the potential to stifle innovation
in the content distribution space (here, the burgeoning music streaming
industry) and to lock listeners into to the current distribution technology.
Arguably, this is not what IP seeks to do—or at least not what it should do.
From a regulatory (if not a contractual) perspective,3 the withdrawal
scenario posited above is a real possibility. Take the recent American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) withdrawals, for
example. ASCAP is a “performance rights organization” (PRO) that
handles the collection and administration of public performance royalties,
which are royalties incurred from the playing of a song on terrestrial or
digital radio. At the beginning of last year, two of the nation’s three major
music publishers4 withdrew their digital copyrights from ASCAP in order
to license them through private deals.
The idea that a music publisher might forego the ease and convenience
of collective licensing of its IP rights in order to do all of the work itself is
counterintuitive. Conventional wisdom justifies collectives because they

2. Concededly, not a limited enough time for some. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg et
al., The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, 18
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651 (2000) (discussing the constitutionality, and overall
desirability, of copyright term extension from the perspectives of incentives, natural
rights, international law, and legislative history). To be clear, it is not suggested that IP
prevents Taylor Swift from having to “compete” with Katy Perry for listeners, but rather
that IP prevents Taylor Swift from having to compete with others for the reproduction
and distribution of her own content.
3. In order to withdraw his content from Spotify, for example, Kanye West would
have to rely upon the terms of his contracts with each of his publishing company and
record label, and, in turn, their respective contractual obligations to Spotify, making the
whole enterprise rather unlikely, though Taylor Swift—who controls her own
publishing—has successfully done just that. See, e.g., Steve Knopper, Taylor Swift
Abruptly Pulls Entire Catalog From Spotify, ROLLING STONE, (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www
.rollingstone.com/music/news/taylor-swift-abruptly-pulls-entire-catalog-from-spotify
-20141103 [http://perma.cc/LN3H-VSXA].
4. A “music publisher” is a company that owns the copyrights on various musical
compositions and licenses the use of those compositions to such entities as radio stations,
sports stadiums, filmmakers, restaurants, and record labels—traditionally through a
collective, but more recently via private negotiation. The three major music publishers in
the U.S. today are Sony Music Publishing, LLC (“Sony”), Universal Music Publishing
Group (“Universal”) and Warner Music Publishing (“Warner”). See, e.g., Ed Christman,
First-Quarter Music Publishing Rankings: SONGS Surges Again, BILLBOARD, (May 12,
2014), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/publishing/6084783/first-quarter-music
-publishing-rankings-songs-surges-again [http://perma.cc/SR7Z-WZ4N] (showing Sony,
Universal, and Warner with 31.9%, 18.1%, and 13.3% market shares, respectively).
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are able to reduce transaction costs and consolidate bargaining power.5
The purported circumvention of ASCAP undermines these justifications
and suggests that they no longer hold sway in the digital age. The rights
withdrawals marked the first ever attempt at withdrawal and private
ordering6 in the music publishing industry and resulted in a negotiated
royalty rate nearly double ASCAP’s going rate.
One could view this result as a coup for the free market: Constrained
by an antiquated consent decree and faced with conflicting member
interests, ASCAP artificially depresses the “market” rate for music
licensing. This result could also be viewed as a pathological form of private
ordering in which two powerful companies wielded their considerable
market power to coerce a supracompetitive rate from a hapless licensee.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine what the market rate looks
like in a highly regulated industry like music publishing7 because there has
never been a true “market” for music licensing in any economically
meaningful sense. While it is true that a songwriter can technically license
her own songs, this is not logistically possible (at least in an analog world).
Nearly every artist uses a collective for all relevant intents and purposes.
The establishment of the music publishing industry arose more or less
simultaneously with the creation of collectives that consolidated
composition copyrights and set a royalty rate, thereby foreclosing the
5. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1302–3 (1996) (“The
high costs of contracting . . . drive the right holders to pool their property rights in a
collective organization. . . . It is the high transaction costs associated with the initial
entitlements that lead the parties to establish the organization—an organization that then
dramatically lowers the costs of exchanging the rights.”). That bargaining power is, of
course, checked by consent decree, see infra Part II.B.5.
6. Here, “private ordering” refers to negotiation and deal making between private
parties, outside of any statutory or regulatory regime.
7. There exists an ongoing debate about copyright’s status as a form of regulation
versus as a property right regime. Compare Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 29, 41 (2005) (proposing that “a person’s right to control the disposition
of his creation, and thereby enjoy the fruits—the profit—of his labors, is central to the
legal definition and protection of property entitlements.”), with Siva Vaidhyanathan,
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 12 (2003) (noting that “copyright issues are now
more about large corporations limiting access to and use of their products . . . . We must
seek a balance. . . . Instead of bolstering ‘intellectual property,’ we should be forging
‘intellectual policy.’”) For the limited purposes of content licensing, at least, the role of
copyright law as regulation is undeniable, and this Article will treat it as such. Not only
do the copyright laws contain statutory licenses for cable and satellite television, for
example, but they also ultimately entrust royalty rate setting to governmentally authorized
entities, including the copyright royalty board, and the rate court.
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development of a free market for the licensing of musical compositions.
For this reason, this Article takes no issue with the rate obtained, but
rather with the potential for unchecked anticompetitive consequences for
artists, licensees, and consumers. Notably, the two music publishers at
issue—Sony and Universal—together control roughly 50% of all digital
music publishing copyrights. Without this content, an Internet radio
service would be hard-pressed to compete for listeners. This was the
argument Pandora advanced in a rate court8 proceeding that challenged
the privately obtained rate as coerced.9
In an industry like music licensing, network effects, parallel pricing
and tacit collusion can exacerbate the effects of consolidation by removing
the threat of meaningful competition10 from the marketplace.11 This
allows individual companies—acting alone or in tacit collusion with
8. In this context, a “rate court” is a court with exclusive jurisdiction to oversee
licensing arrangements between a collective like ASCAP, and a potential licensee, like
Pandora. The rate court’s jurisdictional authority comes from the consent decree
governing the collective. In a recent report on “Copyright and the Music Marketplace,”
the Copyright Office called the rate court “expensive and time-consuming” and noted an
inability to “keep up with the pace set by the new digital marketplace.” U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS 93–94 (2015), http://copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright
-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf [http://perma.cc/45KF-LLUA].
9. In re Petition of Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
[hereinafter Order] (noting that “[u]nless Pandora could do without [Sony’s content] and
remove [the content] from its repertoire . . . Pandora had to obtain a license from Sony or
face crippling copyright infringement claims.”). It is also worth noting that withdrawal
wasn’t necessary from a licensing perspective: ASCAP’s authority to license the
publishers’ content is non-exclusive, meaning the publishers could have readily competed
with ASCAP in the market to license their songs without withdrawing those rights from
the collective. But the withdrawals worked to reduce the field of competition—afterward,
there was only one option for licensing that content, and that was through that publisher
itself, sans consent decree.
10. Much can be made about the definition of “competition,” and about whether it
ought to be used in an economic or antitrust sense, in layman’s terms or aspirationally. In
the words of prominent antitrust scholar Rebecca Haw Allensworth, “‘Competition’ has
no single monolithic meaning; the values traded off in [antitrust] trade in different
currencies, and balancing them thus requires judgment beyond the realm of economics.”
Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1, 4 (2016). This Article takes a broad view of competition, and considers both the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of antitrust law.
11. “Network effects” refer to the increased value to a consumer deriving from an
increase in the number of other consumers enjoying the same product or service. “Parallel
pricing” is the difficult-to-detect situation wherein competitors recognize that it is in
their collective best interest to informally cooperate as to price. “Tacit collusion” refers to
low-level, coordinated effort between similarly situated competitors that does not rise to
the level of a Sherman Act violation. See infra Part III.A.
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similarly situated competitors—to engage in parallel pricing of
performance rights, or to withhold rights altogether, thereby potentially
barring entry to prospective licensees, all while avoiding antitrust scrutiny.
The case of intellectual property, where regulation defers competition
or creates monopolies for creators and inventors for a limited period of
time, is particularly challenging. Professor Suzanne Scotchmer attributed
this dilemma to the fact that “under the Sherman Act, attempts to acquire
or maintain a monopoly are illegal, even though merely being a
monopolist is not. This distinction is especially important in markets with
intellectual property, since intellectual property already grants a ‘legal
monopoly.’”12 It is this unique potential for anticompetitive behavior that
does not meet the definition of antitrust “harm” (i.e., does not explicitly
violate §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act), and therefore is not addressed by
that body of law, that is the focus of this Article.
Normally, where a market operates in a workably competitive manner,
the remedy for anticompetitive behavior can be found in antitrust law. In
music licensing, however, a breakdown in structural competition reduces
the ability of antitrust to function, in large part because antitrust law does
not provide a remedy to address parallel pricing and tacit collusion.
The failure of antitrust in this marketplace is no small irony. At one
point, antitrust law served as a check on the power of the collective
licensing entities by establishing a consent decree to govern their behavior.
No such consent decrees apply to individual publishing companies. This
discrepancy has resulted in a situation where the collective that is being
circumvented now poses less of a competitive concern than the individual,
powerful copyright holders acting privately.
Previous scholarship offers qualified encouragement of private
ordering as a means of increasing efficiency in the shadow of an inefficient
statutory license.13 This Article reaches a different conclusion in the
collective context, where collectives are governed by consent decree while
powerful individual rights holders are not. Currently, the two largest
collectives—ASCAP and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)14—function under

12. Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives 290 (2004).
13. See Kristelia A. García, Private Copyright Reform, 20 MICH. TELECOM. &
TECH. L. REV. 1 (2013).
14. Like ASCAP, BMI is a non-profit music licensing collective that competes with
ASCAP for music publishing rights. In 2014, both ASCAP and BMI reported
administration of approximately $1 billion each in public performance royalties. See
ASCAP, ASCAP 2014 Annual Report at 4 (2014), http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/
pdf/about/annual-reports/ascap_annual_report_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/YD24-UMAJ];
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consent decrees that govern their operations. These consent decrees
originated from concerns about anticompetitive behavior, including
supracompetitive pricing and barriers to entry, that can result from the
consolidation of a large number of copyrights in only a handful of entities.
Notably, these same concerns apply equally to powerful, independent
music publishing companies like Sony and Universal (which also
consolidate large quantities of copyrights). The terms of the consent
decree, however, do not govern those companies’ behavior, nor do they
constrain their ability to harm consumers and innovators who depend on
access to the content.
Prior work also examines the phenomenon of private ordering around
an unpalatable statutory license, or “penalty default license,” as the
inevitable result of inherent inefficiencies and uncertainty.15 Similarly, the
proliferation of private ordering in public performance rights licensing—
where rights are traditionally licensed by collectives—challenges the
conventional view that collectives are the optimally efficient licensing
mechanism. Instead, this phenomenon demonstrates that collectives suffer
many of the same inefficiencies as statutory licenses. While regulation is
often criticized as restricting new entry and interfering with competition
in the marketplace, this Article argues that where a market is structurally
noncompetitive, remedial regulation can open the market to entry and
innovation and can maintain competition therein. This approach is
consistent with prior IP regulatory reform efforts, such as existing
compulsory licensing regimes that ensure ongoing access to content.
Indeed, from a historical perspective, IP rights have often been subject to
regulatory limits—such as compulsory licensing—designed to facilitate
and protect competition in the content distribution marketplace.16
The analysis proceeds in four Parts. Part II begins with a music
licensing primer, then analyzes the recent rate court proceeding between
Pandora and ASCAP to illustrate the emergence of a pathological form of
private ordering in an industry historically dominated by collective
licensing. In addition, Part II describes the rise and fall of collectives as the
preferred means of licensing copyrighted content. Part III discusses the
paradox revealed by this narrative; namely, the fact that the licensing
and BMI Reports Record-Breaking Revenues of Over $1 Billion, BMI (Sept. 10. 2015),
http://www.bmi.com/press/entry/572180 [http://perma.cc/H36T-YCPS].
15. See Kristelia A. García, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117 (2014).
16. See generally Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 278, 279 (2004) (discussing “copyright’s poorly understood role in regulating
competition among rival disseminators”)
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collectives that are being circumvented—once a cause for antitrust concern
due to their consolidation of content, but whose conduct is now governed
by consent decree—now pose less of a competitive concern than the
conduct of powerful copyright holders acting privately. Part IV makes the
case for music as unique among other forms of content in order to explain
the failings of antitrust in the music licensing space and the need for a
different approach. Running contrary to conventional wisdom, Part V
suggests that remedial regulation can encourage and maintain competition
in the music industry in a way that antitrust cannot. In so doing, the
Article provides a powerful case study of how the absence of structural
competition leaves antitrust law unable to police competition and instead
calls for the introduction of remedial regulatory oversight.
II.

PRIVATE ORDERING AS PATHOLOGY

At the beginning of 2014, two of the country’s three major music
publishers attempted for the first time ever to withdraw digital copyrights
that they had previously assigned to ASCAP, in order to license those
rights through private negotiation. This preference for private over
collective licensing17—which resulted in a negotiated royalty rate nearly
double ASCAP’s collective rate—challenges the traditional justifications
for collective rights organizations, such as consolidation of bargaining
power and minimization of transaction costs, and questions the
conventional view of collectives as the optimal means of licensing
copyrighted content.
Those who disfavor the consent decree under which ASCAP operates
would conclude that private ordering predictably leads to rates and terms
that more accurately represent the parties’ respective valuations. This Part
challenges that conclusion and instead posits that despite its perceived
advantages, private ordering in the shadow of a regulated collective can
have negative consequences, including various forms of anticompetitive
behavior and other adverse market impacts. Beginning with a brief
overview of music copyrights and licensing, this Part presents the recent

17. Not just “over,” but in exclusion of, collective licensing (since the grant of rights
to a collective like ASCAP is a non-exclusive one, such that the publishing companies
could have easily left the digital rights with ASCAP while simultaneously licensing them
privately). See United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 1589999, § IV(B)
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 366 (2011). In theory, at least, this would allow
for competition between the music publishers themselves, and even between the
publishers and ASCAP (though this would require that the content not be withdrawn).
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Pandora–ASCAP rate proceeding as an example of what can go right and
what can go wrong in private ordering in the shadow of a collective.
A.

(NEARLY) EVERYTHING YOU NEVER WANTED TO KNOW
ABOUT MUSIC LICENSING
1. Music Licensing 101

The world of music licensing is incredibly (and, many would argue,
unduly) complicated.18 This is as much the result of piecemeal legislation
and powerful lobbyists as it is a reflection of well-intended, yet largely
unsuccessful, attempts to anticipate and accommodate ever-evolving
technologies and consumer preferences.19 For the purposes of this Article,
it suffices to understand that music is unique among copyrighted content
(e.g., films, television programs, novels) in that a single song is actually
comprised of two distinct copyrights: One on the underlying musical
composition20 and another on the sound recording of that musical
composition.21 For each of these copyrights, there exists a companion
right—that of “public performance”—that gives a licensee the right to play
(i.e., perform) a song publicly, such as at a restaurant, sporting event, or
over the terrestrial radio airwaves.
These performance rights may be further broken down into digital
performance rights (for online plays via an Internet radio service like
Pandora), and terrestrial performance rights (for analog plays via an FM
radio station). Copyrights on a musical composition and copyrights on a
sound recording (and their respective public performance rights) are
typically held by different parties and pay royalties differently depending
on the platform and the use within that platform. This dichotomy
(quadchotomy?) results in a number of interesting and counterintuitive
phenomena in music licensing. For example, while the sale of a digital
download of The Beach Boys’ hit song “Surfin’ USA” on Apple’s iTunes
platform triggers a statutory royalty paid on both the underlying musical
composition and the sound recording, playing the same song on an FM
radio station results in a public performance royalty payment to Chuck
Berry, the song’s composer, but no such royalty payment to the Wilson
18. For the especially motivated (or confused) reader, Appendix A offers a more indepth, graphical representation of the music licensing concepts presented in this section.
19. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2006) (detailing a
legislative process that relies on lobbyists for the construction and proposal of copyright laws).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012). Formerly known simply as “sheet music,” a
musical composition can range from a formally notated work to an informal transcription
or approximation of a musical work.
21. See id.
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brothers, performers of the sound recording. This Article is concerned
only with public performance rights on musical compositions (i.e., Chuck
Berry in the above example) and with the collectives that administer those
rights—specifically, ASCAP, the nation’s largest music licensing
collective.
The collective licensing of performance rights for musical
compositions evolved in response to a perceived gap in copyright law.
§ 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter, the “Copyright Act”)22
provides for a compulsory license that allows recording artists to record
cover versions of the musical compositions of other artists. There is no
comparable compulsory license for the public performance of musical
compositions, however. This means that the licensing of public
performance rights for musical compositions must be negotiated between
a content owner and prospective licensee. In other words, § 115 allows for
the creation of a new sound recording of a composition, but not for the
public performance of that composition.
While individual songwriters can technically negotiate and administer
their own public performance rights,23 this is largely impractical—at least
in an analog world. For example, there is no practical way for The Beatles’
estate to monitor—much less invoice and enforce against—every
restaurant, coffee shop, and retail clothing store nationwide that plays any
piece of the band’s extensive repertoire. For this reason, public
performance rights for musical compositions have traditionally been
assigned to and managed by a collective like ASCAP.24
2. Collectives, Consent Decrees & Rate Courts
ASCAP is a non-profit organization that licenses public performance
rights for, and collects and distributes royalties on behalf of, its members.

22. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1).
23. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1) (public performance rights for digital sound
recordings, which are subject to a compulsory license).
24. In the United States, the collective management of performance rights for
musical compositions vests primarily in three organizations: ASCAP, BMI and SESAC.
Most of these rights are held by ASCAP and BMI, the nation’s two largest PROs. The
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) is a much smaller,
privately-held company that handles the remainder or, in rare instances, the individual
songwriters manage the rights themselves and operate under consent decree. This
comports with Professor Wu’s characterization of PROs as more like governmentally
regulated compulsory licensors than as private entities. See Wu, supra note 16, at 280.
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Those members range from individual songwriters with a mere handful of
copyrights to large music publishing companies with thousands of
copyrights. Wielding expertise acquired through repeat negotiation and
utilizing consolidated bargaining power deriving from its large quantity of
content, collectives like ASCAP offer prospective licensees various
licensing options of different configurations, durations, and price points.
The most popular offering, known as a “blanket license,” offers a licensee
the rights to all of the content in a collective’s catalog.25 In exchange for
this service, members pay ASCAP a share of the royalties collected on
their behalf.26 The price at which ASCAP offers its various license
configurations to licensees is determined in the first instance by its
membership, and failing that, by a rate court as detailed below.
ASCAP formed in 1914 in response to a desire for musicians to be
paid when their music was played in public spaces, like restaurants.27 The
popular account recalls Italian composer Giacomo Puccini and American
composer Victor Herbert lunching in New York City when a band in the
restaurant began playing one of Herbert’s hit songs. Puccini allegedly grew
enraged upon learning that Herbert was not being paid for the use of his
song as he would have been in Europe. And so ASCAP was born. Its
founding members included such musical giants as John Philip Sousa,
Irving Berlin, George and Ira Gershwin, and Cole Porter.28 Today,
ASCAP represents over half a million members and has a catalog of over
10 million songs.29
ASCAP operated as the sole public performance rights collective until
1940, when its ongoing battle with the radio industry reached its peak,
and the radio stations pulled all ASCAP-licensed content from the
25. Licensing Help, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/termsdefined.aspx
[http://perma.cc/VTU2-E6TG].
26. As of the publication of this Article, the formula for calculating this share of
royalties is: (use weight) × (licensee weight) × (“follow the dollar” factor) × (time of day
weight) + (audio feature premium credits) + (tv premium credits) = credits. For further, yet
still unsatisfactory, explanation of this calculation, see ASCAP Payment System, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/royalties.aspx [http://perma.cc/9ZF8-2Z48].
Needless to say, the formula is often critiqued for its opacity.
27. To be sure, the Copyright Act of 1909 had a public performance right for sound
recordings, but it had yet to be interpreted doctrinally and so there was no practical
means of enforcing the payment of royalties earned. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L.
No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
28. See Jeff Lunden, Collecting Money for Songwriters, A 100-Year Tug of War, NPR
MUSIC (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/02/13/275920416/collecting-money
-for-songwriters-a-100-year-tug-of-war [http://perma.cc/VY8L-79VA].
29. Happy Birthday, ASCAP!, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/100.aspx#ascaptoday
[http://perma.cc/X5WH-25FV].
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airwaves.30 During the eight months that it took for ASCAP and the
broadcasters’ association to renegotiate a rate, the broadcasters formed
their own collective, BMI, as an ostensible competitor to ASCAP. The
potential for anticompetitive behavior resulting from the consolidation of
performance rights had been exposed, however, and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) took notice.
The long-recognized propensity of collectives to raise concerns about
anticompetitive behavior has been recognized by the academic literature31
and the DOJ alike. The DOJ first alleged ASCAP was an “unlawful
combination” in the early 1930s.32 In 1940, a follow-on lawsuit brought by
the DOJ against both ASCAP and BMI alleging unreasonable restraint of
trade resulted in the imposition of a consent decree to govern the
collectives’ operation.33 ASCAP’s consent decree, originally entered into in

30. Another, less well-documented complaint against ASCAP was its exclusion of
certain genres; specifically, jazz, blues, R&B and “hillbilly” (or country) music. See, e.g.,
CHOSEN CAPITAL: THE JEWISH ENCOUNTER WITH AMERICAN CAPITALISM 144–45
(Rebecca Kobrin ed., 2012).
31. For more on the history of confrontation between ASCAP and radio, see Peter
DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 203–08 (2012). In another example, Glynn Lunney, Copyright
Collectives and Collecting Societies: The United States Experience, in COLLECTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 340 (Daniel J. Gervais ed.,
2010), notes:
In the United States, [collectives] are viewed as something of a
necessary evil. By reducing the transaction costs entailed in enforcing
and licensing the public performance of musical works, they create a
market in which otherwise there would be only infringement. But they
do not merely reduce the transaction costs associated with the public
performance right, they also eliminate competition between the
individual copyright owners over public performance licensing terms
and pricing. Because of this anti-competitive potential, copyright
collectives in the United States have faced recurring litigation over
whether their licensing practices violate the anti-trust laws.
32. Id.
33. For ASCAP’s original consent decree, see United States v. ASCAP, 41 Civ. 1395
(S.D.N.Y. 1941). For BMI’s, see United States v. BMI, 64 Civ. 3787 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
Due to its relatively small size and market power, SESAC is not subject to a consent
decree. It is worth noting that SoundExchange, the designated collective for sound
recordings, differs from the music publishing collectives in that SoundExchange was
designated by the Librarian of Congress as the sole collective for the collection and
administration of sound recording royalties under its regulatory authority. See Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 80 Fed. Reg.
59588 (Oct. 2, 2015) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 380). As such, it does not pose the
same threat of anticompetitive behavior, and therefore does not operate under a consent
decree.
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1941, arose from a lawsuit brought by the DOJ under § 1 of the Sherman
Act of 1890 (hereinafter, the “Sherman Act”).34
As amended in 2001, ASCAP’S consent decree (hereinafter, the
“Second Amended Final Judgment” or “AFJ2”) names the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York (the “SDNY”) as rate
court.35 In that capacity, the SDNY provides a forum for the resolution of
rate disputes between content licensors like ASCAP and content licensees
like Pandora. Where a licensee and ASCAP are not able to reach a fee
agreement, the licensee can petition the SDNY to set a “reasonable fee.”36
At the rate court proceeding, ASCAP has the burden of proving that the
rate it seeks is reasonable.37
Among other things, the AFJ2 requires that ASCAP grant the right
to perform all of the compositions in its repertoire to any prospective
licensee who requests to do so.38 It also prohibits ASCAP from engaging
in price discrimination between similarly situated licensees.39 Notably, the
consent decree governs only the behavior of ASCAP and not that of its
individual members.
3. Music Publishing Consolidation
Songwriters assign their copyrights to music publishing companies,
who in turn license those compositions to recording artists, record labels,
and various analog and digital distribution outlets. When the music
publishing industry first began in the 1890s, royalties earned from the
licensing of musical compositions comprised the majority of music
industry revenues and that continued until the sale of sheet music slowed
during the Great Depression.40 The growing popularity of radio saw
public performance revenues take the lead during World War II.41 The
advent of rock and roll led to a massive increase in album sales, which
pushed royalties earned on sound recordings to the forefront during the
1960s and 1970s.42 Before long, the recording industry dwarfed music
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). The Sherman Act is one of three primary acts that
together constitute U.S. antitrust law. See infra Part IV.
35. See United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 1589999, § IX (S.D.N.Y.
June 11, 2001).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. §§ VI, IX(E).
39. Id. § IX(C).
40. See GEOFFREY P. HULL, THOMAS HUTCHISON & RICHARD STRASSER, THE
MUSIC BUSINESS AND RECORDING INDUSTRY 112 (3d ed. 2011).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 113.
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publishing, which in turn morphed from an industry that focused on
creating musical works, into primarily a “copyright industry” that focused
on licensing musical works.
Given the miniscule bargaining power afforded the owner of a
copyright on a single musical composition (however popular the song), it
is not surprising that music publishing is an industry built on the
acquisition and consolidation of lots of musical compositions. Indeed, the
three major music publishers today are the result of extensive
consolidation among many smaller publishing companies. Universal
resulted from a merger between PolyGram, MCA, Rondor, BMG, and
Zomba. EMI Music Publishing (EMI, acquired by Sony in 2012) began
in 1974 as a combination of Ardmoor, Beechwood, Keith Prowse, and
Central Songs, followed by the addition of Screen Gems and Colgms,
SBK, CBS and Jobette. Warner began in 1929 with its acquisition of
Chappell-Harms. Sony—currently the nation’s largest publisher—got its
start in 1989 when the company purchased CBS (then known as Tree),
and then scored a coup with the purchase of Michael Jackson’s ATV
catalog, which included the Beatles’ repertoire, for a purchase price of
$100 million.43
The most plausible explanation for the dramatic consolidation
observed in the music publishing industry is money—or, more accurately,
the lack thereof. New technological developments including the Internet,
the iPod, and the smartphone have changed the way that people consume
music. This has resulted in a shift away from traditional revenue streams
like CD sales to the sale of digital tracks, and, more recently still, to the
sale of streaming subscriptions. These developments have not only
dramatically reduced absolute revenue in dollars,44 but have also forced
ongoing changes to traditional business models and to the role of
collectives like ASCAP.
B.

PRIVATE LICENSING IN THE SHADOW OF A COLLECTIVE:
PANDORA V. ASCAP

At the beginning 2014 two of the nation’s three major music
publishers attempted to withdraw their digital performance rights from
ASCAP, the collective that governs those rights. Presumably, publishers
had not attempted withdrawal of these rights before for a couple of
reasons: First, because ASCAP’s governing documents didn’t allow for it;
43. Id. at 115.
44. See, e.g., David Pakman, The Price of Music, RECODE (March 18, 2014),
http://recode.net/2014/03/18/the-price-of-music [http://perma.cc/28ZJ-5FK7].
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and second, because publishers didn’t want to. This section follows the
temporal progression of the publishers’ withdrawal and the ensuing
response.
1. Music Publishers Attempt to Withdraw Digital Public Performance
Rights
On November 5, 2012 Pandora asked the SDNY to settle a rate
dispute with ASCAP over digital performance royalties.45 ASCAP
administers the digital performance rights for two of the country’s three
major publishers, Sony and Universal. These companies currently hold
31.9% and 18.1% market share, respectively.46 Pandora is a noninteractive47 digital radio service that licenses digital public performance
rights for the songs offered through its various stations. Pandora users
create personalized digital radio stations in which they request to hear
songs of a certain genre, or that sound like a particular song or artist.
These users can then further refine the listening experience by assigning
the songs played either a “thumbs up” or “thumbs down.”
In July 2005, Pandora and ASCAP negotiated for a blanket license
known as a “form license” that ran from 2005 until Pandora canceled it in
2010.48 The form license, which the parties named the “5.0 License,”
45. See Order, supra note 9, at 6.
46. See Ed Christman, First Quarter Music Publishing Rankings: SONGS Surges Again,
BILLBOARD (May 12, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/publishing/
6084783/first-quarter-music-publishing-rankings-songs-surges-again [http://perma.cc/
3UYW-DZAT]. Already a dominant presence in the industry, Sony became even more
powerful when it acquired EMI’s publishing assets in 2012. See, e.g., Alex Pham, Sony
completes EMI acquisition, creating largest music publisher, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/29/entertainment/la-et-ct-sony-completes-emi-acquisition
-20120629 [http://perma.cc/C6KG-S9WV] (citing the close of the merger, and noting a
catalog of over 2 million makes the combined entity the largest publisher in the world).
See also Ed Christman, Sam Smith’s ‘Stay With Me’ Is Music Publishing’s Big Winner in Q3,
BILLBOARD (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/6304471/sam-smiths
-stay-with-me-is-music-publishings-big-winner-in-q3 [http://perma.cc/7JP3-SP96] (citing
the Sony-EMI combined market share at 31.22% in the third quarter of 2014).
47. “Non-interactive” refers to a music service in which the user cannot choose a
specific song to listen to, but instead can set parameters such as genre, and artists or
albums or songs that the selections should “sound like.” The significance of this
categorization is that non-interactive services can take advantage of the statutory license.
Interactive services – in which users can hear a specific track or artist on demand—cannot
use the statutory license and instead must engage in direct negotiations with rights
holders. In this way, the Internet radio experience offered by services like Pandora is
distinct from digital music platforms like iTunes, on which consumers purchase specific
songs and albums, and also from interactive streaming services like Spotify, on which
users can populate playlists with specific tracks.
48. See Order, supra note 9, at 30.
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required Pandora to pay the greater of either 1.85% of revenue, or a persession rate.49 Citing the difficulty of calculating a per-session rate,
Pandora notified ASCAP of its intent to terminate the form license on
October 28, 2010, at which point the parties negotiated for a new,
“through-to-the-audience” blanket license to run from January 1, 2011
through December 31, 2015.50
In accordance with the consent decree under which it operates,
ASCAP granted the license on a provisional basis, with rates to be
determined after the fact by negotiation.51 Pandora filed its rate court
petition after nearly two years of negotiation with ASCAP without an
agreement as to rate.52 In addition to setting a rate in accordance with
Section 9 of the AFJ2, the rate court’s opinion details a disturbing level of
cooperation among the major music publishing companies. The opinion
also highlights a new and significant development in the licensing of
public performance rights: partial withdrawal of rights from a collective in
favor of private ordering.53
EMI54 was the first of the major music publishers to propose partial
withdrawal of its rights from ASCAP. Citing a desire to unify its
publishing and recording rights in order to offer licensees a single point of
access, as well as a general dissatisfaction with ASCAP’s high
administrative costs, EMI informed ASCAP in September 2010 that it
was considering withdrawing either its digital rights only, or, failing that,
its public performance rights entirely, from ASCAP.55 Shortly thereafter,

49. Id. at 30–31.
50. Id. at 33.
51. See United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 1589999, § 5 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
52. See Order, supra note 9, at 34.
53. One might wonder why, if the music publishers were unhappy with ASCAP
and BMI’s rates, they didn’t simply take their business to SESAC, the remaining
collective. As a small, privately-held collective, SESAC is invitation only, foreclosing this
option to all but a select few rights holders.
54. EMI’s musical composition catalog was acquired by Sony in 2012, and EMI no
longer exists. See supra II.A.3.
55. See Order, supra note 9 at 39. As discussed in Part II.A.1 supra, two different
copyrights protect musical compositions and sound recordings, and these copyrights are
often held by different entities, and then licensed by different collectives. This was the
case with EMI, whose publishing rights were administered by ASCAP, while its sound
recording rights were administered by SoundExchange. If EMI were to withdraw its
rights from ASCAP and SoundExchange, and instead license both in-house, prospective
licensees wouldn’t have to strike two different deals (or so the argument went). In reality,
those licensees would likely already have blanket deals in place with each of ASCAP and
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Sony and Universal expressed interest in withdrawal as well. There was
only one problem at the time: ASCAP’s governing articles didn’t allow for
partial rights withdrawal. As things stood, the publishers either had to
withdraw their rights entirely (i.e., digital and analog), or leave them all
with ASCAP.
2. Amendment of ASCAP’s Governing Articles
This state of affairs didn’t bode well for ASCAP. Fearing the loss of
its largest members (and the associated royalty shares), ASCAP responded
with an unprecedented proposal to amend its governing articles so as to
allow members to withdraw their digital (also known as “new media”)
rights, while allowing ASCAP to retain administrative authority over their
analog rights.56 The proposal was met with skepticism from ASCAP’s
independent writer-members, and rightfully so. The loss of digital revenue
from ASCAP’s largest publisher-members would leave the much smaller
(and less powerful) independent songwriters footing a much larger portion
of the collectives’ overhead. This overhead was largely attributed to analog
collections—physical monitoring of bars, invoicing of sports parks, etc.—
such that those costs would not be diminished much by the digital
withdrawals.
In an effort to convince the smaller member hold-outs to nonetheless
pass the amendment allowing for withdrawal, the major music publishers
took a two-pronged approach: First, they agreed to let ASCAP handle the
distribution (but not negotiation or collection) of digital royalties, albeit at
a much lower administrative fee.57 This would keep at least a little of the
digital money coming in. Second, the withdrawing publishers argued that
by allowing them to go out into the market and obtain higher royalty rates
through private negotiation with licensees, those rates could then be

SoundExchange, and this withdrawal would merely necessitate yet another deal, this time
directly with EMI. But I digress.
56. The digital rights withdrawals required multiple amendments to ASCAP’s
governing documents, effectively removing the withdrawing publishers from the auspices
of the consent decree that governs ASCAP. See Order, supra note 9, at 39. This
withdrawal is referred to herein as “partial withdrawal.” As it happens, only digital rights
might potentially benefit from EMI’s purported “rights unification,” since only digital
rights on the sound recording side are entitled to a public performance royalty. There is
no public performance right for sound recordings on the analog side. That is to say,
terrestrial radio broadcasters do not pay recording artists when they play their music (they
do pay the songwriters), but digital radio broadcasters do. For a full explanation of this
conundrum, see García supra note 15 at 1134–36.
57. See Order, supra note 9, at 53.
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presented to the rate court as evidence of a new “market rate,” allowing
ASCAP in turn to demand a higher rate for all of its members.58
The arguments hit the mark and on April 27, 2011, the ASCAP
Board voted to amend its governing articles to allow a member to
withdraw its new media rights only.59 This amendment is especially
significant given that technological developments are likely to result in the
conversion of most analog ASCAP licensees to digital in the next few
years, rendering ASCAP’s remaining functions obsolete. In addition, the
amendment allows a withdrawing publisher to rejoin at any point, making
withdrawal a very low risk option.60
Within days of the passage of the amendment allowing it to do so,
EMI publicly announced the withdrawal of its digital rights, followed by
Sony’s announcement in July 2012,61 and Universal’s in February 2013.62
By early 2013, two of the three major music publishers had done the
unthinkable—they had withdrawn their digital rights from ASCAP in an
effort to increase profits.
The major music publishers correctly understood the AFJ2’s
requirement that ASCAP license its repertoire to any and all prospective
licensees, preventing ASCAP from using its inherent market power to
demand a higher rate.63 This hand-tying frustrated the music publishing
companies because it kept their going rate below that of sound recordings.
A digital music service like Spotify currently pays $0.0052 per play to
SoundExchange for the public performance rights to a sound recording,
while paying only $0.00052 per play—or one tenth of the rate paid to
SoundExchange—to ASCAP for the same public performance rights to
the underlying musical compositions.64 This disparity reflects a

58. See Order, supra note 9, at 45. As explored further at Part II.C.3.b infra, this
would result in the adoption and enforcement of a potentially misrepresentative “market”
rate.
59. See ASCAP, COMPENDIUM OF ASCAP RULES AND REGULATIONS, Rule 1.12
at 10–14 (2014), http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/members/governing-documents/
compendium-of-ascap-rules-regulations.pdf (hereinafter COMPENDIUM) [http://perma.cc/
9ATQ-QUWM].
60. See Order, supra note 9, at 48.
61. Effective January 1, 2013. See id. at 60–61.
62. Effective July 1, 2013. See id. at 72.
63. See id. at 41.
64. There is little transparency as to rate—neither for licensees nor artists—but the
good folks at Trichordist have extrapolated these commonly accepted figures. See The
Streaming Price Bible – Spotify, YouTube & What 1 Million Plays Means to You,
TRICHORDIST (Nov. 12, 2014), http://thetrichordist.com/2014/11/12/the-streaming-price
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determination by Congress that the nature of the industries for sound
recordings and musical compositions vary in material and substantial ways.
For example, the overhead required to commission and record an album
has traditionally outpaced the cost of signing a songwriter.65
In a further effort to differentiate between the two rights, Congress
included in the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
(DPSRA) a clause prohibiting the rate court from taking sound recording
license rates into account when setting the rates for musical
compositions.66 This congressional prohibition on the rate court, however,
did not keep the major publishers from taking note. At the Pandora–
ASCAP proceeding, Sony’s EVP of Business & Legal Affairs, Peter
Brodsky, cited the “massive unfair disparity” between what Pandora pays
for sound recordings and what it pays for musical compositions as the
principal reason for the company’s withdrawal from ASCAP: “It was the
‘differential’ between the rates paid to the labels and the publishers that
was the problem[.]”67
By December 2012, the withdrawing publishers had succeeded in
wringing yet another amendment from ASCAP—this time, one that
would allow them to withdraw their new media rights selectively (on a
licensee-by-licensee basis). Publishers could then focus their negotiating
efforts on larger, more commercially successful digital partners such as
Pandora while leaving the smaller, bootstrap entities—largely believed to
be fly-by-night anyway68—or ASCAP to deal with.69
The second amendment met with even more resistance from ASCAP’s
embattled writer-members than the first. Nonetheless, it eventually passed
-bible-spotify-youtube-and-what-1-million-plays-means-to-you [http://perma.cc/9U9R
-EKGT].
65. For example, a typical record costs between $500K–$2M to produce. See, e.g.,
Typical investment by a major record company in a newly signed artist, IFPI, http://www.ifpi
.org/how-record-labels-invest.php [http://perma.cc/M6ZC-7WUC]. A typical songwriter’s
advance ranges from $18,000–$100,000. See, e.g., DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 269 (7th ed. 2009). See infra note 88
and accompanying text.
66. Specifically, the DPSRA provides that “[l]icense fees payable for the public
performance of sound recordings . . . shall not be taken into account in any . . .
proceeding to set or adjust the royalties payable to copyright owners of musical works for
the public performance of their works.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(i) (2012).
67. Order, supra note 9, at 63.
68. ASCAP’s VP for New Media and Technology Matthew DeFilippis offered this
explanation: “Given the rapidly changing marketplace and the low barriers to entry, new
digital music services launch quite frequently. Many will never gain traction with listeners
or generate substantial revenue.” Id. at 52.
69. See id. at 51.
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permitting a withdrawing member to indicate that it wished to leave with
ASCAP its digital rights only for services paying less than $5,000 per year
in licensing fees.70 These smaller services now faced a choice: Accept
ASCAP’s 5.0 form license without negotiation or go without the
content.71 As a larger digital service, Pandora faced an even more dire fate:
Private “negotiation” with the major publishers.72
3. “Negotiation”
Pandora’s filing of a rate court petition against ASCAP angered the
heads of major music publishing companies, like Universal’s CEO, Zach
Horowitz, who—through a series of emails and other communications—
encouraged ASCAP’s then-CEO John LoFrumento to “be strong . . . You
can really push Pandora . . . They will pay more . . . .”73 Horowitz also
called Pandora’s counsel on multiple occasions to encourage them to drop
the case by suggesting that in representing Pandora they were losing “huge
goodwill with writers and artists.”74 He sent similar communications to
ASCAP board members, to BMG Publishing CEO Laurent Hubert, to
National Music Publishers Association (NMPA)75 President David
Israelite, and to Sony’s CEO Martin Bandier, whose company had also
withdrawn its digital rights and was at that time in the middle of private
rate negotiations with Pandora.76
Meanwhile, by late November 2012, Pandora believed that it had
finally reached an agreement with ASCAP, and that it was just waiting for
final approval from the ASCAP Board to terminate the rate court
70. See id. at 52, and COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, § 1.12.2(b) stating:
If in part, the Member’s New Media Transmission Licensing Rights
will continue to be licensed and administered by ASCAP for only those
‘New Media Services’ . . . that: (i) qualify for and are licensed by way of
any of ASCAP’s form new media license agreements, or, (ii) qualify for
and are licensed by an ASCAP ‘affiliate’ or ‘multi-site’ license
agreement.
71. See Order, supra note 9, at 52.
72. Pandora’s negotiation with EMI post-withdrawal was reportedly amicable, and
the parties settled on the going rate of 1.85% in May 2011 (leaving Pandora paying the
same as it would under a license with ASCAP, but saving EMI the administrative fees
and royalty shares it would otherwise have had to pay to ASCAP). See Order, supra note
9, at 53–54. Because EMI was acquired by Sony shortly thereafter, however—thereby
severely limiting the duration of the agreement—the remainder of this Article focuses on
the Sony and Universal withdrawals for all intents and purposes.
73. Order, supra note 9, at 57.
74. Id.
75. The NMPA is the U.S. trade association for music publishing.
76. See Order, supra note 9, at 57.
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proceeding. But that approval never came because Sony had threatened to
sue ASCAP if it reached an agreement with Pandora that encompassed
the Sony repertoire.77 Sony also hinted that it would withdraw the rest of
its rights (i.e., its analog rights) if ASCAP otherwise licensed its repertoire
to Pandora.78 As a result of pressure from Sony and from Universal,
ASCAP’s CEO LoFrumento told the ASCAP Board that he planned to
reject the terms they had negotiated with Pandora. None of the Board
members asked for an explanation, nor requested to discuss the rejection
further.79
By this time, Sony had acquired EMI’s publishing catalog and now
controlled roughly 30% of the market for musical compositions.80 On
October 25, 2012, Sony set the tone for its negotiation with Pandora with
this opening remark: “[I]t’s not our intention to shut down Pandora.”81 In
other words, unless Pandora agreed to Sony’s rate or removed all of Sony’s
content from its service by January 1, 2013, it would face crippling
copyright infringement litigation.82 Interestingly, Pandora anticipated, and
had in fact specifically raised, this concern to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) during its review of Sony’s acquisition of EMI,
noting that the combination would leave Pandora “no choice” but to agree
to whatever terms Sony demanded as it “could not survive without access
to the combined Sony and EMI catalogues.”83
In an effort to gain a foothold in its negotiation with Sony, Pandora
requested a list of Sony’s tracks so that it would know which songs would
need to be removed from the service should a rate not be agreed to in
time. No such list was forthcoming. According to Judge Cote, “Sony had a
list readily at hand,” but “understood that it would lose an advantage in its
negotiations with Pandora if it provided the list of works and deliberately

77. Id. at 59.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 61.
81. Id. at 62.
82. Id. at 62–63.
83. Id. at 62. Nonetheless, in the fall of 2012, the FTC announced that it would not
challenge the merger. As discussed in the sections below, this counterintuitive
determination is most likely the result of the FTC’s mandate under the antitrust laws,
which call for intervention in any merger that would “substantially lessen competition.”
See U.S. DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES ¶¶4–6 (2010) (hereinafter
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES). In this case, there was already a breakdown in
structural competition, so that the proposed merger—while not creating or protecting
competition—also did not worsen it.

2016]

FACILITATING COMPETITION

205

chose not to do so.”84 Pandora turned next to ASCAP, making the same
request for a list of Sony’s tracks, but Sony (unsurprisingly) would not give
ASCAP permission to release the list.85
On January 17, 2013, Sony and Pandora agreed to an undisclosed
advance and a rate 25% above ASCAP’s going rate.86 In violation of extant
confidentiality agreements, Sony shouted this rate from the rooftops,
crediting its size for the dramatic rate increase it achieved, and calling the
rate “quite reasonable. When you compare it to the rate record companies
are getting, it was really miniscule.”87
Instead of proffering an efficiency rationale—namely, that digital plays
of a song are easily tracked via readily available technologies, and that
moving the administration of those rights in-house saves the company
royalty shares that it would otherwise have to pay to ASCAP—Sony cited
dissatisfaction with the disparity between the publishing royalty rate and
the sound recording royalty rate: “We were struck by the vast disparity
between what the record companies received from digital music services
for the sound recording rights that they conveyed and what was paid for
the [musical composition] performance right.”88 Historically, the royalty
rate for sound recordings has always been higher. This disparity reflects
the significantly higher overhead costs involved in granting artist advances,
hiring studio time, and pressing and delivering a physical product. In
contrast, music publishing does not require investment in a physical
product, and little in the way of advances, thereby reducing the overall risk
as well. In addition, publishing enjoys a royalty on the terrestrial
performance side that does not extend to recordings at all.89 Nonetheless,
Sony determined that, given its size and market power, it could “really
push Pandora and get a much better settlement as a result . . . [Pandora]
will pay more, a lot more than they originally intended . . . .”90
And Sony was right. Sony’s boast prompted Universal to begin its
negotiations by demanding even more. In February 2013, Universal
84. Id. at 65–66.
85. Id. at 68.
86. Id. at 69; see also, e.g., Sony Negotiates 25% Royalty Increase from Pandora: Report,
BILLBOARD (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/publishing/
1510421/sonyatv-negotiates-25-royalty-increase-from-pandora-report [http://perma.cc/
3SPQ-5ZNS].
87. See Order, supra note 9, at 71.
88. Id. at 40 (testimony of Martin Bandier).
89. For a full discussion of the legislative history behind terrestrial performance
rights, see García, supra note 15.
90. Order, supra note 9, at 57.
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announced its withdrawal of new media rights from ASCAP and began its
private negotiations with Pandora.91 Universal’s Horowitz knew well the
rate his recording counterparts were receiving, as he previously ran that
side of the business for Universal. Following Sony’s lead, Horowitz
opened negotiations with Pandora by saying “we want Pandora to survive,”
followed by “how did you get Marty [Bandier] at Sony to agree to such a
low payment?”92
In response to Universal’s prompt demand for an effective rate 50%
higher than the prevailing ASCAP rate, Pandora repeated the request it
had made of Sony—a request for a list of Universal content for removal
from the Pandora service.93 Unlike Sony, Universal provided Pandora with
the list, but subject to a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) such that
Pandora could not use the list for the purposes of removing any content
(because to do so would require sharing it with programmers). As a result,
Pandora’s options were to either accept Universal’s proffered rate, or face a
flurry of copyright infringement claims.94
On July 1, 2013, the parties provisionally “agreed” to a rate of 7.5%
(just under double the ASCAP rate) for a six-month period (i.e., enough
time to allow for a rate court decision).95 By way of comparison, Universal
charged iHeartRadio—a competitor of Pandora, and subsidiary of radio
conglomerate Clear Channel—a rate of 1.7%.96 This rate is both lower
than ASCAP’s going rate and nearly a quarter of the rate Universal
demanded of Pandora. Like Sony, Universal refused Pandora’s request
that the provisional agreement not be submitted as evidence of a “market
rate” at the rate court proceeding.97 Indeed, ASCAP ultimately presented,
among other things, both the Sony and the Universal rates as benchmarks
for determining a market rate. Meanwhile, Pandora presented 1.70%, or
slightly less than the ASCAP rate.98
4. The Rate Court Determination
After a three-week bench trial that included direct testimony,
deposition testimony, and a variety of submitted affidavits, Judge Cote,
writing on behalf of the rate court, held that “ASCAP has . . . failed to
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 72.
Id. at 74.
See id. at 74–75.
Id. at 76–77.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 7.
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demonstrate that Pandora’s direct licenses with Sony and [Universal]
constitute fair market benchmarks.”99 Specifically, the rate court
determined that “Sony and [Universal] each exercised their considerable
market power to extract supra-competitive prices,” and that “the evidence
at trial revealed troubling coordination between Sony, [Universal], and
ASCAP.”100 Importantly, “ASCAP, Sony, and [Universal] did not act as if
they were competitors with each other in their negotiations with Pandora.
Because their interests were aligned against Pandora, and they coordinated
their activities with respect to Pandora, the very considerable market
power that each of them holds individually was magnified.”101
Judge Cote called the Universal-Pandora rate the result of “virtually no
meaningful negotiations,” and noted that because Universal “control[s]
roughly 20% of the music market, [it] began with and insisted upon a
demand that bore no relation to the then-existing market price,” and as
such “this license rate cannot be said to represent a bargain arrived at by a
willing buyer and seller.”102 As to Sony’s rate, the S.D.N.Y. found that
even if it represented a plausible market valuation, it could not be used as a
benchmark because of “the coercive process by which it was negotiated.”103
In the end, the rate court set a rate of 1.85% of revenues—the same
rate currently available under ASCAP’s 5.0 form license—for every year of
the license term (from 2011 through 2015). An interim determination by
the rate court additionally granted Pandora’s motion for partial summary
judgment by holding that the major publishers’ purported withdrawals of
new media rights—and, by extension, ASCAP’s amended Compendium
allowing them to do so—violates the consent decree.104
Specifically, the court noted that Section IV(C) of the AFJ2 prohibits
ASCAP from licensing a composition to some services (i.e., smaller
digital, and also non-digital) and not others (i.e., larger digital services like
99. Id. at 94.
100. Id. at 97.
101. Id. at 98–99.
102. Id. at 105–06.
103. Id. at 104.
104. See In re Petition of Pandora Media, No. 12 Civ. 8035, 2013 WL 5211927, at 1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013). The court held:
Because the language of the consent decree unambiguously requires
ASCAP to provide Pandora with a license to perform all of the works
in its repertory, and because ASCAP retains the works of ‘withdrawing’
publishers in its repertory even if it purports to lack the right to license
them to a subclass of New Media entities, Pandora’s motion for
summary judgment is granted.
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Pandora).105 The court also interpreted “repertory” as used in the consent
decree to include all of the rights pertaining to a work.106 In other words,
the rate court held that publishers wishing to withdraw their digital rights
must withdraw all of their rights (i.e., digital and analog). This effectively
invalidated Sony and Universal’s attempted withdrawal of digital rights
only, putting to the publishers the more difficult determination of whether
to withdraw analog rights as well, and how to administer them.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the rate court’s decision in its
entirety.107 The appeals court confirmed as to rate, finding that “ASCAP
failed to carry its burden of proving that its proposed rate was
reasonable.”108 With regard to the preclusion of withdrawals by the
consent decree, the Second Circuit confirmed that “[t]he partially
withdrawn works at issue remain in the ASCAP repertory pursuant to the
plain language of the consent decree.”109
5. The Consent Decree
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of ASCAP’s consent decree was
supported by a statement from the DOJ confirming “the consent decree
governing the licensing activities of [ASCAP] does not permit ASCAP to
accept partial grants of public performance rights.”110 In the face of
mounting criticism of the consent decrees as outdated, the Senate
Judiciary Committee has undertaken a review of the consent decrees.111 As
part of this review, the Committee has solicited public comments on,
among other things, whether if “partial or limited grants of licensing rights
to ASCAP and BMI are allowed, should there be limits on how such
grants are structured?”112
105. Id. at 4 (“AFJ2 also contains a provision preventing ASCAP from
discriminating in pricing or with respect to other terms or conditions between similarly
situated licensees.”)
106. Id. at 12–14.
107. Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP et al., 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014).
108. Id. at 78.
109. Id.
110. Brief for U.S. Department of Justice, Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP et al., 785
F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1158-cv(L)), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f312700/
312748.pdf [http://perma.cc/N6FV-TPT9].
111. See Antitrust Consent Decree Review, DOJ http://www.justice.gov/atr/ascap-bmi
-decree-review [http://perma.cc/Z3Y2-3KAV].
112. Antitrust Consent Decree Review—ASCAP and BMI 2014, DOJ, http://www
.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascap-bmi-decree-review.html [http://perma.cc/4Q8G-HCDS]. For
a review of public comments submitted in response to this, and other, inquiries, see
ASCAP and BMI Consent Decree Review Public Comments, DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public-comments [http://perma.cc/GUE3-9HCV].
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On March 10, 2015, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing
on the consent decrees. In what is undoubtedly a first for the music
industry, comments from such traditionally opposed parties as the
National Association of Broadcasters and Public Knowledge (i.e., everyone
except ASCAP and the music publishers) reached a common conclusion:
The consent decrees are necessary to protect against anticompetitive
behavior and to promote competition in online music distribution.113 The
question remains whether this conclusion is true without application to
the individual publishers.
C.

COLLECTIVE LICENSING V. PRIVATE ORDERING

The mass exodus of the major publishers from ASCAP begs the
question: Why would a company who voluntarily joins a collective to
handle the difficult and time-consuming work of royalties collection
suddenly want to withdraw and do all of the work itself? This question can
be answered in two parts: In the first instance, by considering the decline
in advantages afforded by collective action in the digital age; and second,
by detailing the gains to be had from private over collective action. The
final subsection will address potential drawbacks to withdrawing from the
collective, including adverse selection, manipulation of market rates, and
access concerns.
1. Diminished Advantages of Collective Action
The fact that the major music publishers withdrew their digital rights
from ASCAP challenges the conventional wisdom that lauds collective
rights management as the optimal means of licensing copyrighted
content.114 Despite the potential for anticompetitive harm stemming from
the aggregation of copyrights,115 collectives like ASCAP have traditionally
113. Hearing on “How Much for a Song? The Antitrust Decrees that Govern the Market
for Music” Before the S. Subcomm. On Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights,
114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Mike Dowdle, Bonneville International Corporation)
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dowdle%20Testimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/
9PLE-ZLXP].
114. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 5. To some extent, the existence of the consent
decrees further cuts against the notion of collective licensing as an optimal solution to the
transaction cost problem. See DiCola & Sag, supra note 31 at 208. See also Ariel Katz, The
Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective Administration of
Performance Rights, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 541 (2005) (challenging the
traditional case for PROs).
115. Some scholars have gone so far as to call collectives’ blanket licenses “illegal
restraints of trade” insofar as they fix prices for a product that cannot be obtained
elsewhere. See Ivan Reidel, The Taylor Swift Paradox: Superstardom, Excessive Advertising
and Blanket Licenses, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 731, 737 (2011) (declaring blanket licenses to
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been justified on the same bases as other collective bargaining models.
First, they minimize transaction costs associated with identification of,
and negotiation with, multiple contracting partners. In his seminal work
on property rules and IP licensing, Professor Robert Merges explains that
“[i]t is the high transaction costs associated with the initial [rights]
entitlements that lead the parties to establish the [collective]—an
organization that then dramatically lowers the costs of exchanging the
rights.”116 In other words, collectives “conserve on transaction costs by
either making it easier to identify and locate rightholders, or by creating
the occasion for repeat-play, reciprocal bargaining.”117
In her Order, Judge Cote explains how those costs are lowered for
both licensees and licensors:
Employing ASCAP to perform these [licensing] functions is
efficient for music users and copyright holders. A music user can
license an enormous portfolio of copyrighted music through the
execution of a single license without having to contact each
copyright holder. Copyright holders benefit from ASCAP’s
expertise and resources in policing the market, negotiating
licenses, and distributing the revenue from a vast array of licenses
promptly and reliably among the multiple owners of the public
performance copyrights in each work. The ability of ASCAP and
other performing rights organizations . . . to grant licenses
covering a large number of compositions creates significant
economies of scale in the market for music licensing.118

Second, collectives help level the playing field in negotiations by
concentrating bargaining power and by setting (and enforcing) a collective
valuation.119 In an industry like digital music licensing—whose inception
came after the establishment of the collectives and for which there is not,
and never has been, a real market—collectives have a lot of power in
setting the “market” rate. Indeed (with the exception of cases that go to
be “illegal restraints of trade” and calling for urgent reform of DOJ enforcement
practices). While this Article recognizes the growing strength of these (and other)
arguments, they do not negate the valuable role that collectives serve in ensuring access to
content, and in funneling royalties to artists. See infra Part V.B.4.
116. See Merges, supra note 5, at 1302–03.
117. Id. at 1294. Unfortunately, this doesn’t mean that collectives fare any better than
statutory licenses at differentiating amongst individual content valuations. See García,
supra note 15, at 1128–29. In the collectives’ defense, however, it may be the case that
tailoring is not worth the effort in the bundled licensing context.
118. Order, supra note 9, at 11.
119. See Merges, supra note 5 at 1294 (noting that CROs function by
“promulgat[ing] rules and procedures for placing a monetary value on members’ property
rights.”)
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the rate court), ASCAP sets the rate for the content that it administers.
But this can hardly be called a “market rate” in the absence of a market.
To the extent opt-out speaks to inefficiency, we need look no further than
the private “success” of publishers like Sony and Universal for a challenge
to the current system.
Technological development and concomitant changes in consumer
behavior and business models have challenged the traditional justifications
for collectives. For example, searchable online databases have made
identifying content owners easier, greatly reducing the transaction costs
associated with pairing licensees and licensors. For better or for worse,
industry consolidation has decreased the number of smaller, independent
content owners that stand to benefit from pooling their content and
bargaining power.
With respect to digital content, audio matching technologies have
made it both possible and cost-effective for content owners to track their
repertoire’s usage themselves. As more traditional analog outlets—for
example, brick-and-mortar retail stores and restaurants—transition to
digital streaming, the proportion of royalties attributed to analog sources
continues to shrink, eventually allowing a licensor to administer most of its
rights itself. In short, the need for collectives is waning in the digital
world. Additionally, as Professor Daniel Gervais has put it: “Initially,
CMOs developed out of necessity; it was not feasible for authors and
publishers to maintain a direct relationship with users. With the advent of
new technologies, however, authors and publishers are increasingly able to
initiate and maintain a direct relationship with users.”120
2. Advantages of Private Ordering
To be clear, the partial withdrawal of rights from ASCAP by the
major music publishers is a form of private ordering. One interpretation of
the events described in the Pandora–ASCAP proceeding is consistent
with a functioning free market in which a powerful party (or parties)
naturally emerges, through ingenuity and hard work, and in which a
market rate reflecting supply and demand is eventually established. In
other words, proof positive of free market economics.
Under this view, Sony came to a position of market power through
decades of diligent content acquisition and strategic consolidation. Also
under this view, the rate achieved in private negotiation with Pandora
reflects the value of Sony’s content to Pandora’s Internet radio service.
120. Gervais, supra note 31, at 27.
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Otherwise, Pandora would simply take its business elsewhere or shut
down its service.
Another (admittedly oversimplified) reason a company might choose
to withdraw from a collective to negotiate privately is that the company
may be able to do better in the private market (where “better” means that
they can make more money). Previous scholarship examined the potential
advantages of private ordering around an inefficient statutory regime, and
this is arguably another example of improvement on the status quo. There,
the potential gains from private deal making include a higher rate, the
ability to tailor terms to a specific piece of content, use, or partner, and the
flexibility to more easily and readily adjust deal terms in response to new
technologies or business models.121
In the music industry, these advantages have already been observed on
the sound recordings side of the business, where private ordering around a
statutory license initially emerged in 2012. When iHeartMedia122—a large
media conglomerate and owner of hundreds of radio stations nationwide—
and Big Machine—a relatively small record label and home of recording
artist Taylor Swift—circumvented § 114 in favor of private ordering, the
parties benefited in several ways. First, Big Machine gained the right to be
paid on terrestrial plays (a nonexistent right under current laws), while
iHeartMedia secured a lower-than-statutory rate on digital plays. This
scheme was far better tailored (pun intended!) for a radio-friendly artist
like Taylor, and its short, renewable term allowed the parties to make easy
adjustments in the future. Finally, and happily for the parties,
circumvention and private ordering vis-à-vis one partner did not
necessitate private negotiation across the board with all partners. In
addition to lowering the risk associated with circumvention, private
ordering allowed for greater specificity as to the content and uses
contemplated by the parties.
3. Potential Drawbacks to Private Ordering
Despite its purported advantages, private ordering in the shadow of a
collective, and particularly in the context of a highly regulated market like
music publishing, presents a variety of concerns—including adverse

121. See García, supra note 15, at 1146–51.
122. Formerly, Clear Channel Communications, Inc. On September 16, 2014, the
company changed its name to reflect a new commitment to digital media. See Andrew
Hampp, Clear Channel Changes Name to iHeartMedia, BILLBOARD (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6251599/clear-channel-changes-name-iheartmedia
[http://perma.cc/A3V2-F3ZM].
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selection, misrepresentation of market rates, and denial of access to
content.
a) Adverse Selection
As noted in Part II.B.2 supra, not everyone at ASCAP was on board
with the amendments to ASCAP’s governing documents that permitted
selective withdrawal of new media rights. Notably, the individual
songwriter-members expressed concern about the loss of transparency in
the accounting and distribution of royalties to songwriters if the individual
publishers took over those functions. Specifically, “[t]hey were concerned
. . . that the publishers would not manage with as much care the difficult
task of properly accounting for the distribution of fees to multiple rights
holders, and might even retain for themselves certain monies, such as
advances, in which writers believed they were entitled to share.”123
Moreover, ASCAP’s writer-members recognized that a withdrawal of
digital rights represented a withdrawal of cash (i.e., lost royalty shares)
from the collective, leaving the small, independent songwriters and
publishing companies footing a larger share of the cost of daily operations
at ASCAP.124
Resistance intensified with introduction of the second amendment
allowing for selective withdrawal. The independent songwriter members
were unhappy with the monies that ASCAP was losing as a result of the
new media withdrawals and did not want to allow the majors to continue
to weaken the ASCAP organization.125 They were also upset by what they
viewed as a bait-and-switch by the major publishers who had promised to
go out into the market and secure for the industry a higher “market rate.”
Instead, Sony directly licensed DMX (a company that provides digital
music services for retail stores) at a rate considerably lower than the going
ASCAP rate, in exchange for a hefty advance.126 DMX then took that

123. See Order, supra note 9, at 42.
124. See id. at 45. These costs include administrative, litigation, and advocacy
expenses. As the bulk of administrative costs stem from the analog side of the business
(which rights were retained by ASCAP), withdrawal of digital rights did little to reduce
overhead costs while dramatically reducing revenue.
125. See id. at 51.
126. See Steve Gordon, Direct Licensing Controversy: Will Publishers Be Able To License
Public Performing Rights To Digital Music Services Directly (Instead of through the PROs)
and What Are the Consequences for Songwriters? FUTURE OF THE MUSIC BUSINESS (May
27, 2014) http://www.futureofthemusicbusiness.biz/2014/05/direct-licensing-controversy
-will.html [http://perma.cc/4DPR-WPE4] (“In 2007 Sony negotiated a direct deal with
DMX, the digital background music service. In doing so, it received an advance payment
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rate—sans mention of the advance—to the rate court to secure a lower rate
for itself across the board.127 The primary proponent of this second
amendment to ASCAP’s Compendium was Sony, who pushed for its
passage despite receiving legal advice raising “antitrust concerns with the
carve-out proposal.”128
As a result of the major publisher withdrawals, ASCAP’s remaining
members—the songwriters themselves, and the smaller, independent
publishers who lack the ability to demand private negotiation—were left
with a weaker organization. Not only was ASCAP left touting a less
robust and less valuable blanket license, but it was also collecting less in
royalty shares. This put the full burden of covering the costs of
operation—including litigation, lobbying, and advocacy—on the smaller
members left behind.
Prior work has examined the phenomenon of private ordering around
an unpalatable statutory license, or “penalty default license,” as the
inevitable result of inherent inefficiencies and bounded uncertainty.129 The
proliferation of private ordering in the market for collectively licensed IP
rights challenges the conventional view of collectives as the optimally
efficient licensing mechanism, and instead demonstrates that they suffer
many of the same inefficiencies as statutory licenses.130 Specifically, it
shows that in some cases, an individual party can privately negotiate a
higher rate than a collective can command. As a consequence, dominant
market players who are opt out of the collectives, leave behind weaker
players with a weaker organization and set off a downward spiral that has

of 2.7 million dollars. It is doubtful whether Sony’s writers received any portion of this
money.”).
127. See id.; Order, supra note 9, at 51 n.36.
128. Id. at 53 n.37.
129. See García, supra note 15.
130. N.B.: ASCAP has argued that these inefficiencies stem from the consent
decrees themselves:
It is clear that the legal and regulatory restrictions imposed on ASCAP
by the Consent Decree and the Copyright Act severely limit ASCAP’s
members from achieving competitive rates for their works. Indeed, as
the Copyright Office noted in its recent report on Copyright and the
Music Marketplace, ‘[t]here is substantial evidence to support the view
that government-regulated licensing processes imposed on publishers
and songwriters have resulted in depressed rates.’
Hearing on Performance Rights Organization Consent Decrees, 114th Cong. 14 (2015)
(statement of Elizabeth Matthews, ASCAP (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE (2015)), http://www.judiciary.senate
.gov/imo/media/doc/Matthews%20Testimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/HD4C-BMFG].
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negative overall welfare consequences despite the apparent benefits to
early-departers.
Adverse selection—the term used herein to describe this defection of
powerful members from their respective collectives—decreases the
efficiency and efficacy of the abandoned collective. These consequences
stem, in large part, from the fixed costs associated with collective rights
administration and enforcement. In addition to leaving collectives with
reduced income from membership fees, adverse selection may leave
remaining members to suffer reduced royalties as a result of a diminished
catalog, reduced bargaining power, and weaker enforcement capabilities.
These fixed costs are difficult to amortize and may result in a system
with higher gross transaction costs—including litigation and lobbying
expenses—that must be borne by the remaining members. It is true that a
publishing company has no legal or economic obligation to forego
increased revenues in order to avoid making things more difficult for
individual writer-members. Nonetheless, there are potential trickle-down
effects for the entire system. Where the financial burden of sustaining the
collective becomes unsustainable for the weaker members, adverse
selection can lead to diminished distribution of content to consumers. It
also affords defecting members the opportunity for anticompetitive
behavior to the detriment of innovation in both the creation and
dissemination of content.
b) Manipulation of “Market” Rate
The promised upside of this adverse selection—the notion that the
higher rate negotiated by the majors would go on to be adopted as the
“market” rate to the benefit of all—not only proved false, but actually went
the other way when DMX presented its lower rate (sans advance) for
adoption instead.131 The DMX example illustrates how circumvention of a
collective in favor of private can lead to misrepresentation of “market”
rates. This is especially true in an industry like music publishing, where no
131. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc., 683 F.3d 32, 49 (2d Cir. 2012)
(confirming adoption of DMX’s proposed rate); and Steve Gordon, DMX v. BMI
Demonstrates that Digital Services May Use Direct Licensing to Reduce Their Payments to the
PROs but the Decision May Be Reversed on Appeal, THE FUTURE OF THE MUSIC
BUSINESS (July 12, 2011), http://www.futureofthemusicbusiness.biz/2011/07/dmx-vs
-bmi-demonstrates-that-digital.html [http://perma.cc/72T3-6HPR] (discussing DMX’s
successful rate reduction campaign based on the negotiated Sony rate and asking “how
can 550 direct licenses [the number held by Sony] be a benchmark for the true value of
the [collective’s] blanket licenses when those 550 licenses represent, in probability, only a
tiny fraction of the songs represented by the [collective]”).
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real market exists outside of the collectives that have operated more or less
since the industry’s inception.
It is unclear whether the rates obtained by Sony and Universal are
“right” or whether they are supracompetitive (as Pandora has alleged). The
going ASCAP rate may not be “right” either--it may well be, as the music
publishing industry has alleged, the result of Pandora’s manipulations.
Indeed, in a move labeled “cynical and shameless,” Pandora recently
purchased a small, terrestrial radio station in South Dakota in an
unabashed effort to take advantage of the lower statutory rate offered
Internet radio services owned by broadcast radio stations.132
In the context of the ASCAP withdrawals, the major music publishers
also enjoy a first-movers advantage. As first to withdraw their digital
rights and first to go out into the “market” to negotiate a private rate, they
are able to set a baseline rate that subsequent private deals are most likely
to adopt, either by example or by peer pressure. In other words, if Pandora
agrees to a rate double that of ASCAP’s, so too might their competitors (if
they want to remain competitors). This can lead to the establishment of an
industry norm or custom that is based on little more than coercion and
desperation as other digital distribution services are pressured to pay the
same rates or shut down.133
c) Collectives’ Role in Ensuring Access To Content
With all of their faults and potential drawbacks, collectives like
ASCAP serve an important function that private ordering might
otherwise foreclose: access to content for all prospective licensees willing
to pay an agreed-upon rate and meet agreed-upon terms. This access is
enforced by consent decree. The AFJ2 directs ASCAP to “grant to any
132. David Israelite, Statement of National Music Publishers Association (NMPA) CEO
David Israelite, NMPA http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6553964/pandora-radio
-station-fcc-approval-kxmz [http://perma.cc/5U68-6262]. For more on the radio station
purchase, see Glenn Peoples, Pandora Buys Terrestrial Radio Station in South Dakota, Aims
for Lower ASCAP Royalties, BILLBOARD (June 11, 2013), https://www.billboard.com/biz/
articles/news/radio/1566479/pandora-buys-terrestrial-radio-station-in-south-dakota-aims-for
[https://perma.cc/AM4F-FKB8]. The very existence of a different, lower rate structure
for an Internet radio station owned by a broadcast radio station versus a free-standing
Internet radio station illustrates the byzantine nature of the heavily lobbied music industry.
133. For a critique of the influence of custom on law in the IP context, see Jennifer
E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899
(2007). For the same critique in other contexts, see, for example, Lisa Bernstein, The
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999) (criticizing the incorporation of commercial customs into
Article 2 of the UCC).
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music user making a written request therefor a non-exclusive license to all
of the works in the ASCAP repertory.”134 As a result, ASCAP cannot
license its repertory to one Internet radio service and refuse to license
another. Individual music publishers like Sony and Universal can make
such refusals, however. This is particularly concerning where the major
publishers effectively control an asset essential to any music streaming
service: music.135
The concern about access to content is nothing new. Congress has
long recognized the importance of access to the maintenance of
competition in the content industries. For example, the cable industry
operated for many years under so-called “program access rules,” which
required owners of cable programming to make that content available to
rival distributors.136 The program access rules were promulgated as a
central part of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 (the “Cable Act”), and have been credited with
driving the growth of the satellite television industry.137
When the program access rules were enacted, lawmakers were
concerned that content owners would refuse to license content to
competitors.138 As a result of these rules, satellite companies like Dish and

134. United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 1589999, § VI (2001).
135. It may be reasonably argued that while some music is essential to a music
streaming service, one publisher’s content is largely interchangeable with another’s. After
all, if Honey Nut Cheerios suddenly refused to sell its product to Grocery Store A (and it
is allowed to do so), Grocery Store A could simply sub in generic Nutty O’s. Diehard
fans of the original may balk, but would hardly view Grocery Store A as being
competitively disadvantaged. Part IV.B.2.c infra will attempt to show that, for a variety of
reasons, it’s a bit more complicated than that in the music context.
136. See 47 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
137. See, e.g., Comments of the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications
Association Before the Federal Communications Commission at 17 (July 29, 2002),
http://www.sbca.com/PublicAffairsdocs/Competition_2002Comments.pdf
(“Industry
observers credit the program access rules . . . as one of the most important factors in the
rise of DBS as a successful consumer service and competitor to cable.”) [http://perma.cc/
V3MY-NNZK]; Joe Flint, FCC lets program access rules expire, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/05/entertainment/la-et-ct-fcc-program-access
-20121005 [http://perma.cc/EN3L-FJFG].
138. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN AND PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL
CROSSROADS: TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE
343–47 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter DIGITAL CROSSROADS]. Nuechterlein and Weiser note:
The concern underlying these requirements is that a cable incumbent,
left to its own devices, might withhold affiliated programming from its
MVPD [multichannel video program distributor] rivals in the hope
that the programming is so indispensable to the television experience of
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DirecTV grew and proved to be viable competitors. With the growth of
these companies, moreover, the FCC has retained these rules, but now
questions how much longer the rules will stay in place.139
Unfortunately, the music publishing industry does not currently enjoy
robust competition, and collectives play a valuable role in providing—
though not necessarily guaranteeing—access. As Part V infra will discuss,
only a mandatory, compulsory license can guarantee access. But first, the
next Part discusses a final, paradoxical category of concern stemming from
the withdrawal, and private negotiation, of public performance rights:
anticompetitive behavior.
III.

AN ANTITRUST PARADOX

A.

ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR

Perhaps the most unexpected development highlighted by the
Pandora–ASCAP rate proceeding is the growing anticompetitive threat
posed not by ASCAP, but by the individual music publishers acting in
loose coordination to demand more money, or, failing that, to deny access
to their content altogether—something that ASCAP, per the consent
decree, cannot do. The coordination of effort among the major music
publishers and ASCAP went beyond written “encouragement” during
negotiation—Universal’s Horowitz emailed both LoFrumento at ASCAP
and fellow publishing heads at Sony and Warner/BMG, urging them to
“[b]e strong . . . . You can really push Pandora and get a much better
settlement as a result. They are reeling. They will pay more, a lot more
than they originally intended” to include public announcement of terms
afterward, even where such disclosure was in clear contravention of extant
many viewers that they will forgo the rivals’ service in favor of the cable
incumbent’s service.
139. In the Matter of Revision of the Commission’s Program Access, 27 FCC Rcd.
12605, No. 12-123, at 4 (2012) (“[A] preemptive prohibition on exclusive contracts is no
longer ‘necessary to preserve and protection competition and diversity in the distribution
of video programming.’”) (quoting Cablevision Systems Corp. v. F.C.C., 597 F.3d 1306,
1308 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). In Cablevision, the court went on to note that “We anticipate
that cable’s dominance in the MVPD [multichannel video program distributor] market
will have diminished still more by the time the Commission next reviews the prohibition,
and expect that at that time the Commission will weigh heavily Congress’s intention that
the exclusive contract prohibition will eventually sunset.” Id. at 1314. See also DIGITAL
CROSSROADS, supra note 138, at 344 (“In October 2012, the FCC denied a third fiveyear extension, allowed the flat ban on exclusive contracts to expire, and announced that
it would continue to review such exclusive contracts on a case-by-case basis under section
628(b).”)
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NDAs.140 “By mid-January 2013, and despite the existence of a
confidentiality agreement, Sony leaked the key terms of the Pandora
license to the press. . . . [Sony’s] Bandier was quoted as saying that ‘[a]t
the end of the day, we got a terrific deal for our songwriters. Our thinking
has been vindicated.’”141
This announcement by Sony not only informed the other publishers of
the rate Sony had achieved, but also informed the songwriters that those
publishers compete for. In other words, if Universal were to obtain less, its
songwriters could simply go over to Sony, making Sony’s announced rate
the de facto floor. Together with a demand that Pandora remove the
respective publishers’ content, coupled with a refusal to identify that
content, and amid threats of massive copyright litigation,142 this low-level,
coordinated effort is referred to herein as “tacit collusion.”143
A highly concentrated industry like music licensing is especially
vulnerable to this form of anticompetitive conduct. The more
concentrated the market, the greater risk to competition posed by
coordination.144 Some industries—like telecommunications, or utilities—
face a set of circumstances in which multi-firm production is more costly
than single-firm production, and so are said to tend toward “natural
monopoly,” an economic condition in which optimal efficiency is reached
with only one firm in the market.145 The typical natural monopoly industry
faces very high start-up costs. A prospective entrant in such an industry
would be forced (at prohibitive cost and great inefficiency) to recreate
necessary infrastructure already put into place by the dominant firm.146
An oligopoly, on the other hand, is found where a few large, powerful
firms dominate a market, so that the actions of each firm impact the other
firms, and in which each firm recognizes a strategic interdependence with

140. Order, supra note 9, at 57.
141. Id. at 71.
142. See supra, Part II.B.3.
143. As discussed in detail in Part III.B infra, tacit collusion is distinct from explicit
collusion in that the former is not a violation of antitrust law.
144. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 329 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig, eds. 1989); George
Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, J. POL. ECON., 72:1 (1964).
145. See generally, William J. Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in
a Multiproduct Industry, AM. ECON. REV. 67 (1977).
146. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, MICROECONOMICS 42
(2004) (noting, for example, that in a natural monopoly, “the competitor’s profit would
likely not be sufficient to cover the cost of building another network”)
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the other firms.147 As these firms’ combined market share increases, their
strategic interdependence increases. When the minimum efficient scale—
defined as the lowest level of output at which a firm can operate at
minimum cost per unit—is a relatively large percentage of the market,
smaller firms cannot compete, and the market becomes a natural
oligopoly.148 This is the case in music publishing: An industry comprised
of only three firms, each with double-digit market share, demonstrates a
willingness and ability to tacitly collude with respect to price. The
oligopoly condition allows for “a group of firms to reach a collusive
outcome without overt acts of detectable communication. Such tacit
collusion results from a ‘meeting of the minds,’ whereby competitors
recognize that it is in their collective best interests to set price or quantity
equal to the collusive level.”149 This behavior is commonly known as
parallel pricing. While not technically illegal—indeed, and as discussed
further in the next Part, “application of the antitrust laws [in this context]
becomes challenging”150—parallel pricing is nonetheless problematic
precisely because it is difficult to monitor and enforce against.151
Network effects have further exacerbated the effects of consolidation
in the music industry by removing the threat of meaningful competition
from the marketplace. Network effects (also called “network externalities”)
describe the phenomenon—especially prevalent in technology companies—
of an increased value to a consumer deriving from an increase in the
number of other consumers enjoying the same product or service. One is
not likely to choose a laundry detergent based on which brand his closest
friends use, for example, nor is he likely to begin getting more out of his
laundry detergent if his neighbors adopt the same brand. In the case of a
video game console, however, people are more likely than not to adopt the
brand—for example, the Xbox—that their friends are using, as this allows
them to play with together on the same platform. As more and more
people also purchase an Xbox, individual enjoyment of the device grows,

147. See generally HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A
MODERN APPROACH 468–91 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing oligopoly and oligopolistic
pricing behavior).
148. See id. at 427 (defining minimum efficient scale as “the level of output that
minimizes average cost, relative to the size of demand”)
149. Alan Devlin, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Parallel Pricing in Oligopolistic
Markets, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1112–13 (2007).
150. Id. at 1113.
151. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 94 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing the
antitrust laws ought to be able to identify and regulate parallel pricing). This view has not
been adopted.
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both in terms of new game development and a community to play with.
This is an example of network effects.
In music, network effects play a role on both the content and the
distribution side. In distribution, as in the Xbox example, consumers are
more likely to join the music streaming platform that their friends are on
so that they can share playlists, for example. When it comes to the songs
themselves, network effects have been shown to have a significant
influence on consumer tastes and preferences, leading to what this article
will term psychological, as opposed to technological, lock-in. For example,
a 2007 study of over 14,000 listeners took a unique approach to measuring
what types of things influence whether a song will become a “hit.”152 The
authors created an experiment in which the first set of listeners heard a
series of songs and—without any information other than the name of the
artist and title of the song—were asked to rank them in order of
preference. The second set of listeners heard the same series of songs, only
this time they were also given the number of times each song had been
downloaded by others in their social circle. With the second group,
listeners showed a clear preference for songs that others had preferred.
The study concluded that “social influence played as large a role in
determining the market share of successful songs as differences in
quality.”153
For this reason, songs are not truly substitutable. Listeners are as
locked-in to the songs their social group listens to as they are to the
gaming platform their social group plays on. As a result, a fledgling
streaming service cannot compete without a catalog of popular songs. This
enables the owners of popular songs (i.e., the major music publishers)—
acting alone or in tacit collusion with similarly situated entities—to act
anticompetitively by threatening to withhold their content from a service
or by offering favorable rates to one service over another.154
152. See Salganik et al., Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an
Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCIENCE 854 (2006).
153. Duncan J. Watts, Is Justin Timberlake a Product of Cumulative Advantage?, N.Y.
TIMES (April 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/magazine/15wwlnidealab
.t.html [http://perma.cc/S8GR-U898].
154. In a slightly different context, Francesco Parisi and Ben Depoorter have
suggested that in the case of complementary inputs to a derivative work, “price
coordination and monopolistic pricing do not in all circumstances produce inefficient
equilibria.” The Market for Intellectual Property: The Case of Complementary Oligopoly, in
THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 25,
(W. Gordon & R. Watt, eds., 2003). This suggests that the welfare effects of price
coordination and competition may depend on the type and nature of the goods involved,
and that structural competition doesn’t necessarily solve the problem either.

222

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:1

In the case of music publishing, Sony and Universal tacitly colluded to
charge Pandora a higher rate than other Internet radio services were
paying through ASCAP. Given the publishers’ combined market share of
roughly 50%, a prospective entrant into the music streaming space could
be easily blocked by the major publishers’ joint refusal to deal.155
B.

CONSEQUENCES OF ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR

There are a variety of reasons to care about anticompetitive behavior
on the part of music publishers. First, it represents a very real threat to
innovation in both the creation and distribution of content. If publishers
go after the most successful companies in a given space—as they did with
Pandora in the music streaming space—that risks a situation in which the
companies that control an essential input (in this case, music) in one
industry, can threaten to stifle innovation in another, related industry (in
this case, streaming distribution). To be clear, this is not an argument in
favor of Pandora’s preservation, but rather for the preservation of multiple
distribution options.
These content owners can also block access to content altogether.
Without a statutory license, there is no longer guaranteed access to
content, and nothing to stop a content owner who wishes to start its own
streaming service from withholding its content from potential
competitors. Instead of requiring thousands of individual negotiations, a
digital radio service today can obtain upward of 80% of all of the music
publishing rights that they need from a mere three companies. And if
those three companies cooperate on rate, explicitly or tacitly, the
remaining rights holders will eventually be forced to take that rate in order
to remain competitive. Again, this is not an argument in favor of
ASCAP’s preservation necessarily, but rather an argument against the
foreclosure of access to content that enables new entry into the market.
155. This is so despite the fact that most streaming customers actually consume a
mere 5% of the content offered by a typical music service. See, e.g., Paul Resnikoff, 95
Percent of Streaming Music Catalogs Are ‘Irrelevant’ to Consumers, Study Finds, DIGITAL
MUSIC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2015/09/10/95
-percent-of-streaming-music-catalogs-are-irrelevant-to-consumers-study-finds [http://perma
.cc/53XV-TZTU]. Rather, it is consumers’ perspective of what they’re getting that
matters: a user simply feels better paying $9.99 for “millions of songs” than for what they
actually use, which is probably closer to “tens of songs.” For an intriguing argument
against more content for the sake of more content, see Michael Abramowicz, An
Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 37–38
(2004) (suggesting that “changes along the edges of copyright law that lead to slight
reductions in the number of works produced but greater dissemination of other works
could increase social welfare”)
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Some may argue that this behavior is not a real cause for concern.
After all, free market theory tells us that if a company like Sony or
Universal is indeed over-pricing its product or otherwise behaving badly,
the market will correct such behavior by taking its business elsewhere, by
admitting new entrants, and/or by otherwise reacting in such a way as to
drive the price back to a mutually agreeable level. In that case, the
argument could be made that concerns about tacit collusion or parallel
pricing are unwarranted For example, in the IP context the very purpose of
IP rights is to protect copyright owners from competition for a limited
period of time. To the extent competition is suppressed, then, this is
nothing more than the system at work.156
These arguments based on the free market theory assume a
competitive market, and the problem is that the protection from
competition afforded content owners by copyright law does not extend (or,
is not intended to extend) to distributors of that content. For example, as a
content owner, Sony could decide to favor a particular distribution
company (whether by affiliation, or by contractual agreement, or for kicks)
and charge other distribution companies a different amount or decline to
license its content to other distribution companies altogether. This
protects Sony’s favored distributor via an unintended extension of its
lawful copyright protections. Notably, under the AFJ2, ASCAP is
specifically prohibited from exhibiting such favoritism, while no such
restriction applies to Sony as an individual publisher. In other words, the
problem with the free market theory as applied to music licensing is that
there is no competitive market.
While economic theory is not generally hostile to price discrimination
in a competitive marketplace,157 where structural competition has been
compromised such discrimination can cut against innovation by shrinking
the field of competitors. In other words, the problem is not the price itself,
but rather the lack of competition. If a music publisher like Sony decides
to go after Pandora, the most successful distribution company in the
Internet radio space, the result is a situation in which a company with
control over a necessary input—in this case, music—can drive a leading

156. Indeed, Professor Lydia Pallas Loren has suggested that “[t]he entire structure
of the sound recording digital public performance right is statutorily geared to protect
incumbents.” The Dual Narratives in the Landscape of Music Copyright, 52 HOUS. L.
REV. 537, 577 (2014).
157. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 108–09 (2003).
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innovator out of the market. After all, together Sony and Universal own
roughly half of all digital music copyrights. A digital music service would
be hard pressed to compete effectively without this content.158
Indeed, this threat has arisen before. In the wake of Napster’s shut
down in 2001, the major labels formed MusicNet and PressPlay with the
intent of distributing their own content. At that time, there were five
major labels: AOL Time Warner, Bertelsmann and EMI formed
MusicNet, and Vivendi Universal and Sony formed PressPlay. Together,
the five labels—through the newly-formed MusicNet and PressPlay
entities—controlled over 80% of all commercial music.159 This
consolidation of market power predictably led to a DOJ investigation of
allegations from small online music services that the companies “refused
licenses . . . because they did not pony up hundreds of thousands of dollars
for negotiations,” and that “MusicNet and Pressplay could potentially
exclude them from online distribution deals.”160 Although the inquiry
ended in 2003 without further action on behalf of the DOJ, both
companies were promptly broken up and sold off.161
In the short term, Pandora suffers the most obvious injury in the form
of higher licensing costs resulting from a higher royalty rate—to be clear, a
rate both higher than Pandora was previously paying and higher than that
faced by its peers. Importantly, this is not strictly a private harm vis-à-vis
Pandora, but rather a harm that extends to the broader market for music
licensing. Some music consumers can expect to see higher subscription
rates and/or more advertising as Pandora passes along some of its
increased costs, thereby reducing consumer welfare. Other consumers,
158. Collectively, the withdrawal of new media rights by Sony (with the acquisition
of EMI) and Universal reduced ASCAP’s revenues by half. See Order, supra note 9, at 342.
159. See Kelly Donohue, MusicNet & PressPlay: To Trust or Antitrust?, 1 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (noting, in addition, that since “the labels have either bought or
sued remaining competitors, MusicNet and PressPlay virtually control the online music
industry through the use of its copyrights”).
160. Justice Dep’t Begins Probe into MusicNet, PressPlay, BILLBOARD (Aug. 7, 2001)
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/78850/justice-dept-begins-probe-into-musicnet
-pressplay [http://perma.cc/X7TF-D5E3].
161. See, e.g., Jon Healey, N.Y. Firm Buys Out MusicNet, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2005)
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/apr/13/business/fi-musicnet13 (“A New York venture
capital firm said Tuesday that it had taken over MusicNet, an online music service
formed in 1999 by three major record companies and RealNetworks Inc.”) [http://perma
.cc/4RHY-F6ME]; and Roxio Rebranding Pressplay As Napster, BILLBOARD (May 20,
2003),
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/70995/roxio-rebranding-pressplay-as
-napster (“Roxio has acquired online music service Pressplay from Universal Music
Group (UMG) and Sony Music Entertainment and plans to revive it under the Napster
name before March 2004.”) [http://perma.cc/8A2S-PXXL].
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unable to afford the higher subscription rates, may find themselves forced
either into the ad-supported environment or out of the market altogether.
In the long term, tacit price collusion may reduce allocative efficiency
by affording the coordinating companies the opportunity to engage in
parallel pricing so as to raise prices supracompetitively162 or discriminatorily.
The societal harm resulting from parallel pricing takes several forms. First,
as seen previously, some consumers may be priced out of the market.
Second, innovation may decrease if prospective licensees cannot afford the
new “market” rate, and so are deterred from entering in the first place.
In a functioning market, one might expect that this harm would be
short-lived since a truly supracompetitive rate will eventually adjust
downward. In a highly regulated market like music licensing, however,
this adjustment is far from guaranteed.163 Those entrants who do manage
to enter the market will face tacitly collusive pricing in the form of a socalled “price umbrella.” A price umbrella allows a dominant firm (or tacitly
colluding dominant firms) to set a price which all prospective competitors
must either meet or beat (but not exceed) in order to attract buyers.164
Finally, returning to the example, Pandora was targeted for being the
largest, most commercially successful digital licensee in the space.
Collusion of this sort can stifle innovation as potential market entrants
decline to make themselves the new target of powerful content owners.165
In addition to the potentially negative impact on consumers and
innovation, there are also consequences for ASCAP, ASCAP’s writermembers, and smaller licensees. In the interest of self-preservation,
ASCAP was pressured into amending its governing documents in ways
that were not clearly in the interest of the organization as a whole. As a
result, ASCAP’s writer-members are left bearing the lion’s share of
162. Any argument to the effect that the resulting price increase was merely adjusting
for a “below market” price is rebutted first by the lack of a competitive marketplace
(required for such an adjustment to take place); and second, by the fact that if this were
true, there would have been no reason for the companies to work together to raise the
price; the (competitive) market would have self-corrected.
163. Although this isn’t the case in the Pandora–ASCAP example, the publishing
companies could alternately tacitly collude to depress prices in order to bolster a favored
entrant (or entrants), thereby potentially misleading new entrants with artificial price signals.
164. See AM. BAR ASSOC., PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ISSUES 227 (2d ed. 2010).
165. See generally, e.g., Kevin M. Lemley, The Innovative Medium Defense: A Doctrine
to Promote the Multiple Goals of Copyright in the Wake of Advancing Digital Technologies,
110 PA. ST. L. REV. 111, 112 (2005) (extending innovation from a patent law concern to
a copyright one, and considering the ways in which “copyright owners may stifle
innovation in ways never before contemplated”)

226

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:1

ASCAP’s costs. If and when the withdrawing majors take their privately
negotiated rate—nearly twice that of the going ASCAP rate—to the rate
court for adoption as the new “market rate,” smaller licensees (mostly
start-ups and regional services) will face even higher costs of entry.
This is not just an efficiency argument: Unequal treatment of services
also offends freedom of speech principles. Differential treatment of certain
services “harms consumers by delaying the rollout of new distribution
technologies.”166 The greater this differential, the greater the threat to “the
very existence of newer technologies for music distribution.”167 It is further
a disservice to assume that economic effect is the only goal of antitrust,
when in fact antitrust regulation is in significant part an “exercise in
judgment.”168 This judgment includes consideration of both mathematical
and social values.
Another consequence of this breakdown in structural competition is
the potential for technological lock-in. Technological lock-in “is made
possible when a critical mass of interdependent users accepts a
standard.”169 Specifically, “[w]hen switching costs are sufficiently high and
technology-specific network externalities strong, the market may be
subject to excess inertia, or ‘lock-in’ to a particular technology.”170
Closely related to the concept of network effects, technological lock-in
occurs when the incentive to improve an existing technology or to
innovate is diminished by the degree of coordination between users of an
existing technology. In music licensing, the major music publishers can
effect a lock-in to an inferior technology by offering it a better rate than
that offered to other technologies, or by denying access to their content to
other companies altogether. In this way, for example, consumers may be
stuck with a single clunky, outdated music streaming service favored by
the major music publishers, while the developers of superior technology
are either discouraged or pushed out.171
A final, oft-overlooked consequence of this brand of anticompetitive
behavior is the loss of revenues for artists. Without a statutory license that
166. Peter DiCola, Copyright Equality: Free Speech, Efficiency, and Regulatory Parity in
Distribution, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1837, 1839 (2013).
167. Id.
168. Allensworth, supra note 10 at 1, 53–54.
169. Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 817
(1998).
170. Catherine Fazio & Scott Stern, Innovation Incentives, Compatibility, and
Expropriation as an Antitrust Remedy: The Legacy of the Borland/Ashton-Tate Consent
Decree, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 45, 52 (2000).
171. See id.
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guarantees artists a share of royalties,172 creators are potentially denied a
portion of revenues stemming from private deals, with predictable
consequences for the disincentivization of creation. In addition to
reducing transaction costs and consolidating bargaining power, collectives
(in the absence of a statutory license) frequently serve in the role of
“protector” for artists whose interests diverge from those of the
distribution intermediary to whom they have assigned their copyrights.
Previous work has noted, for example, that SoundExchange—as the
designated collective for public performance royalties for sound
recordings—enforces § 114(g)(2) of the Copyright Act’s mandatory
royalties distribution to recording artists (a distribution that does not
necessarily occur under privately negotiated deals).173 Without this
statutory protection, artists are left to whatever distribution they
negotiated in their contract. More often than not, for recording artists
signing onto deals before making a name for themselves, this amount
(where extant) will be significantly lower than the statutory rate.
Similarly, a composer may never receive a share of public performance
royalties paid directly to her music publisher (as opposed to paid through a
collective) as standard music publishing contracts typically deny
songwriters a share in royalties stemming from privately negotiated
licenses.174 ASCAP, on the other hand, offers transparent royalties
collection and administration to all of its members, be they music
publishing companies or individual songwriters. Together, the potential
for diminished economic incentives for both content creators and content
distributors, coupled with a reduction in, or even elimination of access to
that content, represent a real threat to innovation.
IV.

CONVENTIONAL SOLUTIONS & THEIR DISCONTENTS

The Pandora–ASCAP example demonstrates the potential for
unchecked anticompetitive behavior to stifle innovation and to lock
consumers into existing technology while potentially denying artists their
fair share of revenues. There are a few possible options for avoiding these
outcomes. This Part discusses two: First, we can do nothing, and allow the
172. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) mandates a 50/50 split of royalties earned
on digital performance of sound recordings between artists and copyright assignees. 17
U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) (2012). See infra Part III.B for more detail on this oft-overlooked
consequence of statutory circumvention.
173. See García, supra note 15, at 1151–52; infra Part V.B.4.
174. See PASSMAN, supra note 65 at 264 (“[A]ll songwriter contracts say the writer
doesn’t share in any performance monies received by the publisher.”).
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market to correct itself. Alternately, we can turn to antitrust law. As
detailed herein, neither of these options is particularly effective in the music
licensing context, nor, indeed, in highly regulated industries generally.
A.

THE FREE MARKET APPROACH

Classic free market theory, or economic liberalism theory, suggests one
possible response to anticompetitive behavior: Do nothing, and allow the
market to correct itself.175 Starting from basic supply and demand, the free
market theory tells us that with little to no government intervention,
producers and consumers will come together in the marketplace to set
optimal prices. The general rule is that profit-maximizing firms will
ultimately settle on the price where marginal cost (the cost of producing
one additional unit) equals marginal revenue (the additional revenue that
can be earned on the sale of one additional unit).
Under this theory, where a firm has over- or under-shot the
equilibrium price, consumers will respond by moving toward the firm, or
toward its competition, until eventually the equilibrium price is reached.
In a two-entity market for widgets, for example, if Company A prices its
widgets too high, free market theory says that consumers will purchase
their widgets from Company B, unless and until Company A lowers its
price (or, alternately, differentiates its widgets in some way). Company B
may respond by further lowering its price, and so on, but neither company
will go below the equilibrium price.176 Similarly, if Company B refuses to
sell its widgets to a downstream entrant, Company A can step in and fill
the order. In this way, a market can correct itself, and anticompetitive
behavior is avoided.
Unfortunately, this self-correction is only possible in a workably
competitive market, or one with low to no barriers to entry (such that the
monopoly won’t be sustainable). What we have instead in the music
publishing industry is a highly concentrated market, with high barriers to

175. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (2002)
(making the case for competition capitalism).
176. Some companies will engage in so-called “loss leading” behavior, where they
may actually sell at a loss for some period of time, or for certain product lines, in an effort
to build interest in some other product line, or in the company generally. Amazon’s
Prime delivery service—grossly underpriced, but catering to the company’s biggest
spenders—is a good example of this. See, e.g., Greg Bensinger, Amazon’s Spending Leads
to Biggest Quarterly Loss in 14 Years, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/amazons-spending-leads-to-another-loss-1414095239
[http://perma.cc/BF37
-8NT4].
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entry. In his testimony to the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB)177 on behalf
of Pandora, Professor Carl Shapiro notes that:
A moderately or highly concentrated market in which the
leading suppliers tacitly collude is not workably competitive. For
example, if the leading suppliers have settled into some form of
coordinated interaction, e.g., by refraining from competing
actively to poach each other’s customers, the market will fail to
be workably competitive. More generally, if the leading suppliers
are colluding—either expressly or tacitly—the market is not
workably competitive.178

This is precisely what exists in music licensing—leading suppliers of
public performance rights tacitly colluding to demand higher royalty rates.
Applying these principles directly to interactive music streaming services,
Shapiro continues:
If interactive streaming services indeed ‘must carry’ the music
from each of several major record companies to be competitive,
and if these services have a limited ability to control the mix of
music played by their customers because customers pick which
songs to listen to, the market for recorded music licensed to
interactive streaming services is not workably competitive.179

Notwithstanding the efforts of Congress, the DOJ, and the relevant
courts, consolidation in the music industries has only intensified.
Currently, a mere three record labels constitute 65% of the music found on
Pandora,180 while the three largest music publishers control roughly 65%
of the market for musical compositions.181 Notably, the cooperation
177. The CRB consists of three judges appointed by the Librarian of Congress. The
Board determines and adjusts statutory rates under the Copyright Act. See Copyright
Royalty Judges, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/crb/background/
[http://perma.cc/KA8Q-XBDV].
178. In re Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and
Digital Performance of Sound Recordings, 14-CRB-001-WR, at 11 (U.S.C.R.B. Oct. 6,
2014) (Written Direct Testimony of Carl Shapiro), http://www.loc.gov/crb/rate/14
-CRB-0001-WR/statements/Pandora/14_Written_Direct_Testimony_of_Carl_Shapiro
_with_Appendices_PUBLIC_pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/4RQ6-7Y3L].
179. Id. at 12. Pandora, on the other hand, is not an interactive music streaming
service because its consumers aren’t able to choose specific songs to listen to. Shapiro goes
on to differentiate Pandora’s service from the interactive services for the purposes of
suggesting that any rate reached vis-à-vis the interactive services should not be extended
to Pandora, which he argues is able to steer consumers toward or away from certain
songs.
180. See Shapiro Written Testimony, supra note 178, at 13 n.19.
181. See Christman, supra note 46 (offering first quarter 2015 rankings for music
publishing).
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among the major music publishers that Judge Cote in her Order calls
“collusion” happened in spite of extant antitrust laws and multiple
opportunities for antitrust review. Without a workably competitive
market, the forces of supply and demand are not able to correct a
supracompetitive price, nor check such anticompetitive practices as refusal
to deal. The anticompetitive behavior revealed by the Pandora–ASCAP
proceeding occurred in a highly regulated industry, in the shadow of a
consent decree, and under the auspices of a rate court and two different
regulatory agencies: the DOJ and the FTC. This points to an extensive
breakdown in structural competition.
B.

ANTITRUST LAW

The significance of a loss of structural competition is that antitrust, the
usual go-to solution for checking anticompetitive behaviors, doesn’t work
well (if at all) without it. In the absence of a workably competitive market,
antitrust law is largely ineffective, for the reasons described in this section.
This is especially true when, as here in music licensing, there is a highly
regulated market with a differentiated good, like songs.
1. Inapplicability
The biggest challenge for antitrust in this context is the inapplicability
of its usual arsenal: the Sherman Act, merger review, and consent decrees.
a) Limitations of the Sherman Act
The most significant challenge for antitrust in the content licensing
context is that neither of the concerning behaviors at issue—i.e., neither
tacit collusion nor parallel pricing—rise to the level of a Sherman Act
violation, yet both carry significant competitive downsides. Section 1 of
the Sherman Act forbids all contracts and business combinations made “in
restraint of trade,” while § 2 prohibits monopolization and attempts to
monopolize.182 Unlike explicit collusion, tacit collusion is not a violation of
§ 1.183
182. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (2012).
183. See, e.g., William H. Page, A Neo-Chicago Approach to Concerted Action, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 173, at Part I (2012) (concluding that “Section 1 does not reach tacit
collusion”). Cf. Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach,
21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1598–605 (1968) (arguing that tacit collusion should violate § 1).
Judge Posner’s position has not been adopted, however, as he himself has acknowledged.
See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F. 3d 651, 654 (2002)
(acknowledging that “it is generally believed . . . that an express, manifested agreement,
and thus an agreement involving actual, verbalized communication, must be proved in
order for a price-fixing conspiracy to be actionable under the Sherman Act”). This piece
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In their treatise on antitrust law, Professors Areeda, Hovenkamp and
Elhauge write that “[t]he courts are nearly unanimous in saying that mere
interdependent parallelism does not establish the contract, combination,
or conspiracy required by Sherman Act § 1.”184 The Supreme Court
confirmed this interpretation:
Because § 1 of the Sherman Act “does not prohibit [all]
unreasonable restraints of trade . . . but only restraints effected by
a contract, combination, or conspiracy,” . . . “[t]he crucial
question” is whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct
“stem[s] from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit
or express[.]” . . . While a showing of parallel “business behavior
is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder
may infer agreement,” it falls short of “conclusively establish[ing]
agreement or . . . itself constitut[ing] a Sherman Act offense.”185

The Court went on to hold that “[e]ven ‘conscious parallelism,’ a
common reaction of ‘firms in a concentrated market [that] recogniz[e]
their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to
price and output decisions’ is ‘not in itself unlawful.”186 Unfortunately for
antitrust regulators, the coordination between Sony and Universal is
precisely this sort of “conscious parallelism” that can be contributed to
“shared economic interests” and “interdependence.”
Parallel pricing similarly does not constitute an antitrust violation.
While parallel pricing is not technically illegal, it is indicative of a highly
concentrated market.187 In Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., the Supreme Court considered a case that American television
producers brought against their Japanese counterparts in which they
alleged that the Japanese firms:
had illegally conspired to drive American firms from the market
by engaging in a scheme to fix and maintain artificially high
prices for television sets sold by petitioners in Japan and, at the

takes no position on whether or not these behaviors should fall under the auspices
of the Sherman Act, but rather takes their exclusion as well-established.
184. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1433(a) (2003).
185. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007) (alterations in
original; internal citations omitted).
186. Id.
187. See generally, Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962) (discussing
parallel behavior among firms); infra Part III.A.
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same time, to fix and maintain low prices for the sets exported to
and sold in the United States.188

There, the Court concluded that “conduct as consistent with permissible
competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an
inference of antitrust conspiracy.”189
As with tacit collusion, the difficulty with parallel pricing lies in its
ambiguity. The question remains whether Sony and Universal could have
independently decided to withdraw and demand a higher rate from
Pandora. Arguably—and herein lies the rub for antitrust: it is inapplicable
to some instances of anticompetitive behavior. While a colorable argument
could be made that Sony and Universal’s conduct with regard to the partial
withdrawals goes beyond mere parallel pricing and tacit collusion into
actionable anticompetitive behavior, the fact remains that the DOJ and
the FTC have both declined to act.
b) Limitations of Merger Review
Both the DOJ and the FTC enforce the antitrust laws as laid out in
three distinct, but related, acts: the Sherman Act,190 the Clayton Antitrust
Act of 1914 (the “Clayton Act”),191 and the Robinson-Patman Act of
1936 (the Robinson-Patman Act”).192 Broadly speaking, the Sherman Act
prohibits all combinations “in restraint of trade” and makes it unlawful to
monopolize an industry.193 The Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts focus
specifically on price discrimination.194
The DOJ and the FTC typically allocate merger reviews according to
their relative expertise in different subject matter areas. Most recently, the
FTC has handled merger review for the music industry. In the case of
Sony’s acquisition of EMI—a move that took the already concentrated
music publishing industry from four firms to three—the FTC declined to
challenge the merger. While approval of 4-to-3 mergers is not unique in
the antitrust context, it is unusual to see a merger approved despite explicit
concerns voiced about the majors’ ability to influence pricing: In the wake
of the FTC’s 2012 review of the proposed Sony-EMI merger, Pandora
188. 475 U.S. 574, 574 (2012).
189. Id. at 588.
190. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
191. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 13.
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. For more on the legislative history behind its enactment, see
Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966).
194. See Bork, supra note 193.
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filed an opposition cautioning that “the combination of the Sony and EMI
catalogs would give Pandora ‘no choice’ but to enter into a direct license
for the content. While Pandora ‘could survive without access to Sony’s
musical content,’ it ‘could not survive without access to the combined Sony
and EMI catalogues.’”195
At the same time Sony was looking to acquire EMI’s publishing
catalog, Universal sought to acquire EMI’s recorded music business. In
that case too, the FTC declined to intervene.196 Because the FTC only
publishes its findings when a merger is challenged, the agency’s decisionmaking process is not fully transparent in either case. The most likely
explanation for the agency’s decision lies in its mandate that calls for
intervention in any merger that would “substantially lessen
competition.”197 In the music publishing industry, there was already a
breakdown in structural competition, such that the proposed merger—
while neither creating nor protecting competition—also did not worsen it.
The FTC most likely approved Sony’s acquisition of EMI’s catalog
because it didn’t make matters worse: The competitive environment in
music licensing was dismal before the Sony-EMI merger and remained
dismal afterward. In other words, “the FTC was not able to establish that
the merger would lessen competition in the market . . . because of a lack of
evidence of pre-merger competition.”198
Another possible explanation for the agency’s decision is that the
companies’ catalogs were viewed as complements, rather than substitutes.
In that case, a music streaming service would require both companies’
catalogs, such that the FTC did not view the combination as a horizontal
merger.199 With a mandate allowing for intervention only where a

195. Order, supra note 9, at 62.
196. Notably, the European Union’s antitrust regulators also approved both mergers,
but only with divestitures. In the case of Universal/EMI, this included divestiture of 60%
of EMI’s European business. See Vanessa Mock et al., Universal to Win EMI – After
Selling Key Assets, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872
396390444032404578006343033008694 [http://perma.cc/W5BA-594F]. The FTC required
no such divestitures.
197. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 83 at ¶¶ 4–6.
198. Shapiro Written Testimony, supra note 178, at 13 n.17 (referring to the
Universal/EMI merger approval).
199. See id. at n.15 (calling it obvious that “the FTC saw the repertoires of Universal
and EMI as complements, not substitutes, for interactive streaming services. Therefore,
for this group of buyers, the Universal/EMI merger was not a horizontal merger, and the
normal loss of direct competition that occurs in a horizontal merger was not present.”).
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combination will worsen competition, antitrust can do little in an industry
that has lost its structural competition.200
While it is too late for the music licensing industry—antitrust law
cannot institute structural competition once it is lost—an important lesson
may be gleaned for antitrust law and industry consolidation going forward:
Where antitrust fails to prevent consolidation up front, it may be
powerless to “fix” the problem afterward. The music industry offers a
powerful cautionary tale as to why structural competition matters, and why
the structural presumption does not always apply.
c) Limitations of Consent Decrees
One of antitrust’s most effective tools, the consent decree, has likewise
proven ineffective in the music licensing space. As discussed at Part
I(A)(2) supra, the DOJ first imposed a consent decree on ASCAP in
1941.201 That decree, last amended in 2001, required ASCAP “to grant to
any music user making a written request therefor a non-exclusive license to
perform all of the works in the ASCAP repertory.”202
Prompted by anticompetitive concerns about ASCAP’s consolidation
of content, the consent decree restricts how ASCAP licenses content in a
variety of ways. Among other things, it makes a copyright owner’s grant of
licensing authority to ASCAP non-exclusive—which means that a rights
holder can always license its own content—and requires that ASCAP
charge all similarly-situated entities the same rate.203 These requirements
were intended to assuage concerns about anticompetitive behavior in
music licensing. But the consent decree acts only on ASCAP, and not on
ASCAP’s individual members, thus limiting its ability to thwart
anticompetitive behavior on the part of individual entities.
The FTC, through its repeated determination not to intervene in the
series of mergers that have reduced the music publishing industry to a
mere three entities, has effectively foreclosed a finding of worsened
competition stemming from anticompetitive behavior on behalf of the
individual publishers: ASCAP’s consent decree requires all grants from
rights holders be made on a non-exclusive basis, thereby allowing a party
to opt out and negotiate privately. This assumes that the individual
200. As Part IV.B.2.c infra explains, music goods are complementary and not
substitutable, making this situation different from the standard 4-to-3 merger.
201. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
202. See United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 1589999, § VI (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
203. Id. § IV(B)–(C).
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publisher, acting alone, does not have the ability to act anticompetitively.
Unfortunately, this assumption is wrong. Sony, the nation’s largest music
publisher, currently enjoys a market share of roughly 30%, and may well be
able to exercise unilateral monopoly power in some circumstances. When
working in tacit collusion with Universal, the combined market share is
raised to nearly 50%.
Antitrust law does not provide a remedy for breaking up monopolist
(or oligopolist) firms unless and until they engage in predatory conduct.
Even if one firm is not found to be monopolistic on its own, two or more
firms may tacitly collude to set prices or to bar entry to a new service by
withholding content altogether. It is well established that antitrust law
does not address the oligopolist problem of tacit collusion.204 This is why
the maintenance of structural competition is so important. Where it is not
maintained—as in the case of the music industry—it cannot be rebuilt.
In light of the discontent stemming from the attempted withdrawals
by Sony and Universal, the Senate Judiciary Committee has begun a
review of ASCAP’s consent decree.205 In his request for comments,
Senator Leahy called for “renewed attention to the consent decrees” in
order to “ensure the decrees’ purposes are still being met.”206 By and large,
the publicly available comments received to date recognize the role and
import of a consent decree for the purposes of creating and protecting
competition in the music licensing space.
In its written comments, ASCAP focuses on three overarching
suggestions for changes to its consent decree: First, an expedited ratesetting process to replace the rate court.207 Second, ASCAP seeks a
congressional blessing to allow for partial digital withdrawals, claiming
that “this approach would result in competitive market transactions that
would then provide informative benchmarks for the rate-setting
tribunal.”208 Unfortunately for ASCAP, “competitive market transactions”
between “truly willing buyers and willing sellers” is not possible without a
competitive market.209 Finally, ASCAP asks for permission to license not
only public performance rights, but also mechanicals, synchronization, and
204. See id. (proposing that tacit collusion is not—and should not—constitute a
violation of the antitrust laws).
205. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
206. How Much For A Song?: The Antitrust Decrees That Govern the Market for Music,
114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy), http://www.judiciary.senate
.gov/imo/media/doc/03-10-15LeahyStatement.pdf [http://perma.cc/HYC2-ASEN].
207. See Matthews, supra note 129 at 19.
208. Id. at 19–20.
209. Id. For further rebuttal of this claim, see supra Part II.C.3.b.
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print rights. This would arguably create a “‘one-stop shop’ for musical
work rights.”210 While this would undoubtedly improve upon the labyrinth
that potential music licensees currently navigate, it could also exacerbate
the potential for anticompetitive behavior on behalf of the collective.
Pandora and ASCAP agree that the consent decrees aren’t working,
but for different reasons. Pandora’s comments, not surprisingly, urge
caution and note several judicially recognized instances of “egregious
misconduct” on behalf of the music publishers and collectives.211 In
addition to Judge Cote’s finding of “troubling coordination” in the
Pandora–ASCAP proceeding, Pandora references a December 2013
proceeding between Pandora and BMI in which the judge held that “BMI
cannot combine with [music publishers] by holding in its repertory
compositions that come with an invitation to a boycott attached.”212
Notably, both of these findings occurred under extant consent decrees. So
long as the consent decrees do not apply to individual entities, and those
entities are allowed to withdraw, the consent decrees are powerless to
correct anticompetitive behavior arising from private ordering of the type
seen here. For this reason, the consent decrees no longer function to curb
anticompetitive behavior.213
2. Challenges
Even where antitrust is applicable, it is an ex post review—that is, the
review is conducted only when the alleged harm is already evident.214 At
that point, both the review and enforcement of a remedy—if one is even

210. See Matthews, supra note 129 at 20.
211. See How Much For A Song?: The Antitrust Decrees That Govern the Market for
Music, 114th Cong. 4 (2015) (statement of Christopher S. Harrison, Pandora Media, Inc.)
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harrison%20Testimony.pdf [http://perma
.cc/47KJ-BU4W].
212. Id.
213. The problem of anticompetitive behavior unchecked by antitrust is not exclusive
to music publishing. Sound recordings have also devolved into a natural oligopoly
situation, with a mere three entities controlling nearly all sound recordings copyrights. See
supra Part III.A. In the case of sound recordings, however, piracy serves as a check on
most anticompetitive behavior. Unlike music publishers, the record labels are at all times
arguably “competing with free,” which keeps them honest in a way that music publishers
don’t face.
214. This is not to say that antitrust cannot have ex ante effects as well. See, e.g., Parisi
& Depoorter, supra note 154 at 21 (discussing the effect of antitrust rulings on
competition between direct and intermediary licensors).
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available—are notoriously cumbersome, time-consuming, and costly.215
Antitrust cases are also notoriously difficult to prove. Even if there was
conduct rising to the level of an antirust violation, antitrust is ill-suited to
high-tech industries like music licensing where antitrust enforcers’ ability
to understand and predict industry evolution is especially limited.216 In
addition to the inapplicability of antitrust law to certain anticompetitive
behaviors and its procedural shortcomings, antitrust faces particular
challenges in the context of highly-regulated industries, in the IP field,
and music in particular.
a) In the Regulatory Context
Regulation frequently works to encourage investment in an industry by
protecting the firms within it. This is especially true in industries with
high start-up costs, or with high risks of failure, and for companies that
rely on a distribution system. Public utilities, for example, face all of these
challenges, and new entry into these markets requires substantial
investment. In the early years of electricity generation, “companies saw
clearly the advantages of a regulated marketplace to protect their
investments from unbridled competition.”217
Extensive regulatory regimes tend to undermine antitrust by giving
firms an implied immunity from antitrust review.218 For this reason,
215. See, e.g., Comment of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, FERC
Docket No. RM11-14-000 at 1 (2011) (noting that “[i]nconsistent approaches may make
the antitrust review process longer, more confusing, and more costly than necessary”).
216. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Antitrust for High-Tech and Low: Regulation,
Innovation, and Risk, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 169, 169–70 (2013) (claiming that
“[t]raditional problems of regulation generally, and of antitrust enforcement specifically,
are exaggerated in high-technology sectors, where antitrust enforcers’ abilities to
understand and predict industry evolution are most limited and where enforcement
actions are most likely to rest on debatable predicates about the effects of specific
conduct.”). Cf. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (offering an
example of sophisticated antitrust analysis in a high-tech context).
217. See MARY M. TIMNEY, POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: PROTECTING STATES’
ENERGY POLICY INTERESTS IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 47 (2004).
218. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory
Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 686 (2009) (asserting that “antitrust laws are impliedly
repealed by government regulation of a particular industry”); Daniel F. Spulber &
Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of
Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1851 (2007) (“Courts have long recognized that the
enactment of a federal regulatory scheme can immunize particular conduct from antitrust
scrutiny.”); see also Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276 (citing
four conditions that the court will consider in determining whether a regulatory regime
precludes antitrust, and determining that “the securities law impliedly precludes the
application of the antitrust laws”).
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regulation is frequently considered to have anticompetitive consequences,
and to work at odds with antitrust. Music’s regulatory regime—comprising
an entire Act219 and meriting congressional reconsideration220—likewise
reduces the role of antitrust, not least of all because IP regulation protects
creators and inventors from competition (albeit for a limited period of
time).221
b) In the Intellectual Property Context
An important challenge for antitrust in the music industry is its
juxtaposition to the intellectual property context. IP law necessarily
contravenes antitrust law insofar as it grants limited “monopolies” to
inventions, content, and brands via property rights afforded by patent,
copyright, and trademark law, respectively. In each case, these legally
sanctioned monopolies are limited in both scope and duration, and are
traditionally justified by the proposition that on balance, they produce
enough social utility—by encouraging creation and dissemination of new
content—to offset the societal costs of deterring competition.222
Of course, the exclusive rights granted by copyright do not a true
economic monopoly make. For example, most novels are copyrighted, but
no one novel is considered to have a monopoly on the genre as a whole.
This is because while imperfect, content is generally considered

219. See The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (1976).
220. See, e.g., Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 315 (2013) (calling for “comprehensive review and revision of U.S. copyright law”).
221. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 335, 341 (2004) (“One consequence of regulation is a reduced role
for the antitrust laws. When the government makes rules about price or output, market
forces no longer govern. To that extent antitrust is shoved aside.”).
222. Professors Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley explain the justification this way:
Because intellectual property rights impose costs on the public, the
intellectual property laws can be justified by the public gods argument
only to the extent that the laws on balance encourage enough creation
and dissemination of new works to offset those costs. One of the
reasons that intellectual property rights are limited in scope, in
duration, and in effect is precisely in order to balance these costs and
benefits . . . . The key to economic efficiency lies in balancing the social
benefit of providing economic incentives for creation and the costs of
limiting the diffusion of knowledge.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1.3 (2002) (hereinafter
TREATISE).
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substitutable.223 If a bookstore doesn’t have a title that a friend
recommends, or if it is selling a comparable title for half the price, the
customer may choose to purchase the comparable title. This consolation
purchase may not prevent the customer from purchasing the
recommended book in the future, but the choice demonstrates the limited
power of copyright’s “monopoly” grant. Most individual copyrights (for
example, a copyright to a single song) are not viewed as conferring market
power on individual owners, but in the aggregate they may—for example,
a music publisher with rights to millions of songs.
The highly technical nature of many IP-related disputes challenges
antitrust still further. Some commentators suggest that antitrust’s
impotence in the IP context owes further to its overly narrow analysis that
ignores this “marketplace of ideas.”224 Academics, industry, and legislators
have all lamented the difficulties of policing the so-called “marketplace of
ideas,” defined as “a sphere in which intangible values compete for
acceptance,” and also as “a form of nonprice competition.”225 The idea
underlying this push for expanded merger review is to recognize that
technologically inclined firms compete on a number of dimensions other
than price such as the pace and breadth of innovation, customer service,
and overall quality.226
Much of the emphasis in case law at the intersection of antitrust and
IP has been on compulsory licensing as a theoretical equitable remedy for
the anticompetitive exploitation of IP rights. For example, 17 U.S.C.
§ 115 contains a compulsory cover license, under which licensees willing
to pay the statutory rate may license the use of a musical composition for
the purpose of creating a sound recording. This represents an exception to
the copyright holder’s general right to exclude. In this sense, compulsory
licenses reflect a balance between exclusive rights for copyright owners and
ensure access to creative works. Notably, this balance stems from a
regulatory, and not an antitrust, solution.
223. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright
Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 37 (2004) (“Copyrighted works can serve as
imperfect substitutes for one another . . . .”).
224. See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 249 (2001) (arguing for antitrust merger review to be expanded
“to include its impact on the ‘marketplace of ideas’”).
225. Id. at 251, 297. For another example of antitrust’s impotence in the IP

context, see Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability
Policy, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1549 (2009) (suggesting that in lieu of antitrust,
the DMCA’s interoperability exemption be expanded)
226. Id. at 279.
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c) In the Music Context
One of the biggest challenges to the application of the free market
theory to the music publishing industry is that free market economics
assumes a competitive marketplace for rival and excludable goods.
Unfortunately, that is not the state of affairs for the music industry, which
instead touts a single, public good—songs—in a marketplace that is not
workably competitive.227 As a noncompetitive market, music is uniquely
susceptible to anticompetitive concerns.228
First, music is a differentiated product—that is, each song is unique,
and consumers of music value variety. This demonstrates that the model
of perfect competition does not apply because that model “assume[s] that
many suppliers offer a homogenous product.”229 This is not the case in
music, where no one song is a perfect substitute for another. Sellers of
differentiated products, like songs, can typically demand a price above
marginal cost and how much above depends on the buyer’s elasticity of
demand.
In music, an interactive service—one that allows consumers to select
specific songs to play—is said to have nearly inelastic demand, and so
typically faces higher prices than noninteractive services in which
consumers can merely guide the song selection by dictating genre, or
indicating “sounds like” choices. This is because, as Professor Shapiro
describes in detail in his written testimony, a noninteractive service like
Pandora has the ability to “steer” playlists toward some songs and away
from others.230 This makes non-interactive services’ demand largely elastic,
thereby lowering the price they can demand.
In addition, in the music-licensing context, one publisher’s catalog is
frequently complementary with—and not substitutable for—another’s.231

227. Unlike standard goods—including those traditionally protected by property
rights, like a house—songs, once released, are not excludable, nor is their worth
diminished through their use by others. N.B.: Professor Yoo has persuasively argued that
copyrighted goods are more accurately viewed as “impure public goods,” or goods that are
non-rival but excludable, or non-excludable but rival. Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and
Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 635 (2007).
228. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984) (stating that “[t]he goal of antirust is to perfect the operation of competitive
markets.”) (emphasis added).
229. Shapiro Written Testimony, supra note 178, at 4.
230. Shapiro Written Testimony, supra note 178, at 5–7 (“[T]he more easily a music
service can steer listeners toward or away from specific sound recordings, the lower will be
the price that music service will be able to negotiate.”).
231. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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This circumstance cuts to the heart of the conflict between IP and
antitrust in the form of unilateral refusals to license.232 In the absence of a
compulsory license, IP owners are generally under no obligation to license
the intellectual property, nor, indeed, to use it at all.233 This is problematic
from an economic perspective because licensing (at least in theory) allows
the market to transfer IP to its most productive use.234 Meanwhile, the
DOJ Antitrust Division’s Intellectual Property Guidelines take the
position that content licensing is essentially pro-competitive:
Licensing, cross-licensing, or otherwise transferring intellectual
property . . . can facilitate integration of the licensed property
with complementary factors of production. This integration can
lead to more efficient exploitation of the intellectual property,
benefiting consumers through the reduction of costs and the
introduction of new products. Such arrangements increase the
value of intellectual property to consumers and to the developers
of the technology. By potentially increasing the expected returns
from intellectual property, licensing also can increase the
incentive for its creation and thus promote greater investment in
research and development.235

In other words, licensing is the most efficient means of extracting
value from an IP right, and circumstances that allow for lower levels of
licensing, such as withdrawals and refusals to deal, may lead to lower value
levels as well.236
232. See TREATISE, supra note 222, § 13.1 (stating that “[u]nilateral refusal to license
cases . . . cut to the heart of the intellectual property owner’s right to exclude others from
practicing the intellectual property” and noting that “[a]s such, efforts to invoke antitrust
law in this context deserve special scrutiny.”).
233. Id. § 13.2a (stating that “an intellectual property owner has no obligation to use
its right at all.”); id. § 13.2b (adding that the “‘right’ to refrain from using intellectual
property would be a hollow thing indeed if the intellectual property owner could not
prevent others from infringing the right.”). Indeed, the common justification for
compulsory licenses is their role as a point of guaranteed access. While outside the scope
of the immediate Article, future work will consider the theory and practice of this type of
engineered access.
234. Id. § 13.2 (“Economic theory encourages licensing because it allows the market
to transfer the intellectual property right to the most productive user of that right.”).
235. U.S. DOJ & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property,
JUSTICE.GOV, § 2.3 (Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-guidelines
-licensing-intellectual-property (hereinafter Antitrust Guidelines for IP) [http://perma.cc/
ZL8A-GXGV].
236. The courts have also recognized the importance of licensing, primarily through
the doctrine of copyright misuse. Copyright misuse is an affirmative defense akin to
“unclean hands.” See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F.Supp.2d 1087,
1102 (2002) (“Copyright misuse as a defense to an infringement action finds its origins in
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Congress has recognized the special situation of the music industry as
a peddler of complimentary, but differentiated goods. It is also susceptible
to refusals to license. Concern over the latter in particular is reflected in
the compulsory license scheme prevalent in copyright law as it applies to
music specifically. For example, § 115—the compulsory license for cover
songs—recognizes a conflict between the societal value inherent in the
creation of different versions of a song and the propensity for copyright
owners to deny the realization of this value. The compulsory license
resolves this conflict by limiting the copyright holder’s ability to refuse to
license in exchange for money in the form of the statutory rate. Professor
Jane Ginsburg has written:
[T]he real purpose of a compulsory license is to reduce the extent
to which copyright ownership of the covered work conveys
monopoly power, so that the copyright owner must make the
work available to all who wish to access and exploit it.237

The existence of a compulsory license also supports the claim that in
the absence of a workably competitive market, some form of regulation is
called for. In copyright, regulation already exists and can be fairly readily
augmented to make up for the short reach of antitrust in the music
context. In other words, a market that is not workably competitive cannot
self-correct, and antitrust cannot curb behaviors outside its purview, but
regulation can. The next Part suggests that contrary to the conventional
view of regulation as competition-reducing, “remedial regulation” can
encourage competition in a way that antitrust cannot.
V.

FACILITATING COMPETITION THROUGH
REGULATION

There is a third option for checking anticompetitive behavior,
maintaining
competition,
encouraging
innovation,
preventing
technological lock-in, and ensuring payment to artists: regulation. The
conventional view of regulation is as a system that works against
competition; one that thwarts new entry and protects incumbents.238
Indeed, the Telecommunications Act of 1996—intended to mark the
deregulation of the telecommunications industry—proclaims as its
the equitable defense of unclean hands and is similar to the patent law defense of the
same name.”)
237. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works
of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1926 (1990).
238. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B.2.a.
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purpose: “To promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies.”239 The goal of this Part is to challenge
the conventional view and to present regulation as potentially procompetitive.
Conventional thinking about how to approach the competition
problem, or bargaining breakdown, in content generally falls into two
divergent points of view: There are those who would reduce dependence
upon (or in some cases do away with altogether) the current statutory
licensing regime in favor of private ordering and/or other, preferable
mechanisms such as fair use, patent pools, and collectives;240 and those
who favor compulsory licensing over private deal making for avoiding
bottlenecks and for more robust information exchange.241 The former view
ignores the important role compulsory licenses play in ensuring access to
content; the latter ignores the potential informational value derived from
private rate setting. Both of these perspectives ignore the competitive
market.
This Article departs from both of these perspectives, proposing instead
a new model for maintaining competition in the licensing of intellectual
property rights. This proposal calls for adherence to a mandatory,
compulsory license by default, but embraces private ordering where (and

239. Title page of 47 U.S.C. (1996) (emphasis added).
240. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613 (1982)
(“In extreme instances, Congress may correct for market distortions by imposing a
regulatory solution such as a compulsory licensing scheme,” but maintaining that “the
broad brush of this regulatory solution is too sweeping for most cases.”); Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989,
1061–67, 1068–83 (1997) (pushing for new rules around derivative works and fair use as
preferable to compulsory licensing for avoiding bargaining breakdowns in copyright);
Merges, supra note 5, at 1295–96 (arguing against compulsory licensing as subject to
“legislative lock-in” and instead favoring such devices as patent pools and collectives like
ASCAP for overcoming bargaining obstacles); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 75–
76 (1994) (arguing for expanded use of reverse doctrine of equivalents over compulsory
licensing for the avoidance of bargaining breakdowns in patent law).
241. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1092–94 (1995) (arguing
that compulsory licensing can induce parties to reveal their “truthful revelation,” thereby
overcoming bargaining breakdown); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. J. 283 (1996), 334–35 nn.247–48 (discussing Ayres
& Talley’s theory).
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only when) real competition can be shown to exist between rival content
licensors. This proposal, referred to herein as the “remedial regulation
model,” utilizes existing mechanisms—specifically, statutory licenses, a
collective administrator, and existing regulatory authorities—to correct
anticompetitive behavior at minimal cost.
The current competition policy for the licensing of intellectual
property assumes robust competition, and so allows for private ordering in
the shadow of the statutory license. For example, § 114 of the Copyright
Act allows copyright owners to either use the statutory license, or to
negotiate their own royalty rates and license terms for the public
performance of sound recordings.242 As a result, conventional antitrust
mechanisms—like ASCAP’s consent decree—are wholly ineffective
against anticompetitive behavior perpetrated by individuals, who can
merely opt-out.
The remedial regulation model updates copyright’s competition policy
by reversing this assumption. Instead, it assumes monopolistic (or
oligopolistic) market power, thereby converting the existing,
circumventable statutory licenses into mandatory, compulsory licenses
under which parties may petition for permission to deal privately.
Requiring only minimal statutory amendment and utilizing existing
regulatory agencies and collectives, the remedial regulation model offers
licensors and licensees a compromise: Continued access to content for all
at a predictable rate and the flexibility to negotiate private terms, so long
as industry consolidation has not reached a point so as to call into question
the arms-length nature of any such transactions. This proposal builds, in
part, on the existing literature on penalty defaults and altering rules. After
a brief review of default theory, this Part will show its application in the
regulatory context and will detail a remedial regulatory solution to
copyright’s competition problem.
A.

PENALTY DEFAULTS, ALTERING RULES & COMPETITION
1. Default Theory

A “penalty default” is an undesirable fall back option designed to
penalize those who, through failure to do or to not do some thing (be it
negotiate, or share information), do not otherwise negotiate around it.
The concept of “penalty default rules” was first introduced by Professors

242. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(e) (2012).
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Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner,243 who described them as unpalatable
fallback options in contract law that kick in unless the parties negotiate
their own terms. Such rules, they argue, induce more knowledgeable
parties to “reveal information by contracting around the default penalty.”244
Prior work has extended this concept to licensing and demonstrates that
“penalty default licenses encourage[] more efficient deal making among
otherwise unequal parties by motivating them to circumvent an inefficient
statutory license in favor of private ordering.”245
In other words, penalty defaults are a mechanism by which regulators
can encourage or discourage a certain behavior without regulating that
behavior directly. This is particularly useful where the behavior sought to
be modified is not easily regulated, such as to encourage retirement
savings, organ donation, and to curb pollution.246 The next section argues
that penalty defaults might also prove especially useful for regulating
behavior that is not readily ameliorated by existing legal regimes, such as
the anticompetitive behavior of the individual music publishing companies
whose tacit collusion and parallel pricing activities are not checked by
antitrust.
Altering rules establish the “necessary and sufficient conditions for
altering default legal consequences.”247 “Impeding” altering rules aim to
“deter opt-out by artificially increasing its difficulty.”248 This is effectively
what remedial regulation does: By requiring a showing of sufficient
competition before private ordering is permitted, the statutory license is
made “quasi-mandatory” or sticky.249

243. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 91 (1989).
244. Id. at 94. In other words, where a penalty default rule results in an undesirable
outcome for Party A (possessor of information unknown to Party B), Party A may be
incentivized to negotiate around the default term, thereby revealing his information not
only to Party B, but also to the legislature, which can use that information to draft better
rules, default and otherwise.
245. García, supra note 15, at 1122 (emphasis added).
246. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUSSTEIN, NUDGE (2008)
(identifying areas in which behavior modification via incentive or encouragement might
be best received).
247. Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE
L.J. 2032, 2114 (2012).
248. Id. at 2084.
249. Id. at 2087.
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2. Application to Regulation
In the regulatory context, the remedial concept behind impeding
altering rules works to penalize an undesirable behavior in hopes of
encouraging a different behavior. Here, it does so by mandating
compliance with a statutory rate—thereby foreclosing private ordering
with all of its potential benefits—unless and until sufficient competition
can be shown in the relevant marketplace.
There is precedent for this approach. In wholesale electricity, for
example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sets the
applicable rates for energy transmission. A utility company is allowed to
charge a “market-based tariff only if [the company] demonstrates that it
lacks or has adequately mitigated market power, lacks the capacity to erect
other barriers to entry, and has avoided giving preferences to its
affiliates.”250
Varying in procedure, but similar in spirit, are patent pools, or the
pooling of patents between two or more companies. Patent pooling is
generally acceptable, even favored, unless “(1) excluded firms cannot
effectively compete in the relevant market for the good incorporating the
licensed technologies and (2) the pool participants collectively possess
market power in the relevant market.”251 Where these conditions exist, the
DOJ or the FTC will review the licensing arrangement for anticompetitive
effect before determining whether the parties will be allowed to engage in
the pooling activity. In both of these examples, a competitive marketplace
is not assumed, but must first be shown.
B.

REMEDIAL REGULATION

In lieu of antitrust, this Article advocates utilizing remedial
regulation—or, regulation that discourages industry consolidation—in
250. Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
County, Wash., 554 U.S. 527, 537 (2008); see also Market-Based Rates For Wholesale
Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity And Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Order No.
697, 119 FERC ¶ 61,295, at ¶ 7 (2007), http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/
2007/062107/E-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T36A-BAVL], which cites the development of a
4-prong analysis for determining whether a seller can engage in private ordering:
(1) [W]hether the seller and its affiliates lack, or have adequately
mitigated, market power in generation; (2) whether the seller and its
affiliates lack, or have adequately mitigated, market power in
transmission; (3) whether the seller or its affiliates can erect other
barriers to entry; and (4) whether there is evidence involving the seller
or its affiliates that relates to affiliate abuse or reciprocal dealing.
251. Antitrust Guidelines for IP, supra note 235, § 5.5.

2016]

FACILITATING COMPETITION

247

order to open the market and maintain competition. This model assumes
a baseline that tends toward oligopoly, natural or otherwise, and so allows
for private ordering only where sufficient competition can first be shown.
Otherwise, regulation operates to ensure ongoing access to the relevant
input(s) for all prospective consumers or licensees able and willing to meet
the statutory requirements and to pay the statutory rate. Because this
regulation does not necessarily represent a market rate—nor, indeed, as
high a rate as private ordering might obtain—this Article labels it
“remedial.” It punishes the lack of a competitive marketplace.
If a company wants to engage in private ordering to obtain a higher
rate or better terms, it must first petition to show the existence of
sufficient competition in the relevant market. While such “remedial
regulation” cannot create a robust competitive market where none exists, it
can prevent a few powerful firms from unilaterally controlling the price for
an input, or from barring new entry to the market altogether to the
detriment of both consumers and innovators in the space. As is the case
with other highly regulated industries, the underlying assumption here is
that the government has a greater responsibility for checking
anticompetitive behavior in the music licensing space owing to its role in
the granting of exclusive property rights via copyright.
As with the wholesale electricity example, remedial regulation places
the burden of proving a competitive marketplace on the party seeking to
get out from under the statutory regime. This resets the baseline
assumption and brings competition policy in line with positive market
conditions, while at the same time establishing a “safe harbor” that allows
for private ordering (and its concomitant advantages) when, and only
when, sufficient competition can be shown. The next section outlines one
possible path toward implementation of remedial regulation in the music
licensing context.
1. Logistics
In the music licensing context, remedial regulation does three things.
First, it removes the authority for negotiation found in certain statutory
licenses,252 thereby converting them into mandatory (i.e., non-

252. For example, 17 USC § 114(e) permits:
[A]ny copyright owners of sound recordings and any entities
performing sound recordings affected by this section [to] negotiate and
agree upon the royalty rates and license terms and conditions for the
performance of such sound recordings and the proportionate division of
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circumventable) statutory licenses. Specifically, transition to a remedial
regulatory regime begins with the conversion of existing non-mandatory
statutory licenses—like § 114253—into a mandatory, statutory license.
There is precedent for this in the Copyright Act itself: Both § 111 (for
broadcast cable) and § 119 (for satellite television)254 are mandatory,
compulsory licenses that do not allow for circumvention and private
ordering.
Next, remedial regulation also establishes a new compulsory license for
the public performance of musical compositions. Currently, these rights
are negotiated in the market, allowing for the types of anticompetitive
conduct seen in the music licensing space. The establishment of a
compulsory license provides a guaranteed point of access by removing the
threat of unilateral refusals to license. As with other compulsory licenses—
such as § 115’s cover license—this statutory infringement on the
exclusionary rights of copyright owners is justified by the societal benefit
of avoiding anticompetitive behavior that threatens to stifle innovation in
the distribution space. These compulsory licenses serve as impeding
altering rules, or sticky defaults, intended to make opt-out difficult.
These newly mandatory compulsory licenses can be administered by a
governmentally authorized collective. As it did with SoundExchange in
the context of public performance rights for sound recordings, the
government could likewise designate one of the existing collectives—such
as ASCAP or BMI—or elect to form an entirely new collective to be
charged with the administration and distribution of royalties for these
newly-created licenses. In any case, the CRB retains rate-setting authority
for all statutory licenses.
Finally, a remedial regulatory regime establishes a procedure through
which a rights holder wishing to forego the statutory license and engage in
private ordering may petition to do so via a showing of sufficient
competition in the market for music licensing. A party wishing to
circumvent the statutory license files a petition with the regulatory body
(most likely the FTC, given both its institutional competence and
specialization in the music industry).255 This designation would require a
fees paid among copyright owners, and [to] designate common agents
on a nonexclusive basis to negotiate, agree to, pay, or receive payments.
17 U.S.C. § 114(e) (2012).
253. 17 U.S.C. § 114.
254. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119.
255. One might also suggest that the additional workload for the FTC is its just
desert for allowing the market concentration in music licensing to reach its current levels.
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congressional delegation of authority to the FTC for petition review.256
The FTC then either accepts the petition, allowing parties to circumvent
and engage in private negotiation, or rejects it, in which case the parties
must proceed under the statutory rates set by the CRB. Importantly, this
ensures continued access to content regardless of the state of competition,
while simultaneously eliminating adverse selection concerns resulting from
opt-out of the most powerful parties.
A petition to circumvent mandatory statutory licenses must show real
and sufficient competition in the relevant market. In the wholesale
electricity context, FERC requires a company seeking authorization to
engage in “market-based rates” or “MBRs” file an application under § 205
of the Federal Power Act.257 Borrowing liberally from that application’s
guidelines, a petition in the music-licensing context might require any or
all of the following:


A letter explaining the basis for the petition, and
containing contact information and a description of the
petitioning entity’s business.



A description of the specific type of license to be
negotiated for by petitioner.



A description of any affiliates of the petitioner and their
business activities. Or, if the petitioner has no affiliates,
the application should include a representation to that
effect. Affiliates can be defined as, but not limited to,
upstream owners and wholly or partially owned entities.



Representations of how the petitioner satisfies the
reviewing agency’s concerns with regard to horizontal
market power.



Representations of how the petitioner satisfies the
reviewing agency’s concerns with regard to vertical
market power.



Representations of how the petitioner satisfies the
reviewing agency’s concerns with regard to barriers to
entry and unilateral refusals to license.

Congress might consider an appeals process to allow for dispute
resolution in the event of dissatisfaction regarding a determination by the
256. For an excellent analysis of the various government institutions that participate
in the making and enforcement of copyright law, and the pros and cons of each, see
DiCola & Sag, supra note 31.
257. See 16 U.S.C. § 12 (2014).
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reviewing agency, or disagreement about the sufficiency of evidence
presented. Should an appeals option present too heavy a burden for the
reviewing agency, it should be noted that FERC has successfully defended
the lack of an appeals process in the MBR context.
In sum, the remedial regulation model establishes a regulatory regime
that punishes a lack of competition by prohibiting private ordering, and all
of the benefits that it brings, until sufficient competition can be shown.
This discourages incumbents from amassing market power, since increased
market share will only limit their ability to engage in private negotiation
and deal making. It also mitigates some of the potential drawbacks of
private ordering, such as the misrepresentation of “market” rates, and
adverse selection consequences borne by smaller licensors when their larger
counterparts withdraw.
2. Applicability
Certain features make an industry particularly well suited for remedial
regulation. The first is lack of a functioning market. In the music licensing
context, the concern is anticompetitive behavior such as tacit collusion and
parallel pricing, but breakdowns in market function are found in other
places as well, for example, in industries specializing in differentiated
and/or complementary products; i.e., products which do not face perfect
competition. A regulatory scheme that punishes dominance by denying
dominant players the freedom to negotiate privately is a scheme that
discourages such convergence in the first place.
Second is the inapplicability of another legal regime, such as the
inapplicability of antitrust law to the anticompetitive behavior exemplified
by the individual music publishing companies. Where an extant set of laws
is unable to modify unwanted or undesirable behavior, remedial regulation
may be able to achieve the desired result with minimal statutory
amendment and lowered costs by utilizing existing regulatory bodies and
agencies.
Remedial regulation is particularly well suited to industries already
subject to extensive regulation. In those cases, the regulatory regime is
likely already working at cross-purposes with a more hands-off
approach—such as the inherent conflict between copyright’s limited
monopoly grant and antitrust law. The existence of an extensive regulatory
regime also makes remedial regulation an easy transition: First, the
industry players are accustomed to regulation; second, many of the
statutory terms that will come to constitute the remedial regulation are
likely to already be in place. The same is true of existing agencies, giving
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remedial regulation an advantageous starting point, and lowering the cost
of implementation.
Finally, remedial regulation can also be useful in certain contexts—
such as highly technical fields, like IP—where lawmakers and
administrators are unlikely to fully understand the nuances in a field,
and/or where the industry players have a distinct advantage over
lawmakers in their ability to anticipate and respond to new developments.
In those markets, remedial regulation places the burden on the parties to
make a case for themselves and the market in which they operate. This
puts the informational demands on the party best equipped to provide the
relevant information, and at the least cost.
3. Challenges
The suggestion to implement additional regulation, remedial or
otherwise, in an already highly regulated environment such as music
licensing, is not made lightly. As a general matter, regulation begets
regulatory gaming, or “private behavior that harnesses procompetitive or
neutral regulations and uses them for exclusionary purposes.”258 In their
seminal article on this topic, Professors Dogan and Lemley suggest that
while regulatory gaming cannot generally be avoided ex ante, it may be
checked by continued antitrust oversight of regulated markets.259 While
not a wholesale fix, the fact that the DOJ and the FTC would continue to
have jurisdiction over the music publishing companies should assuage
gaming concerns here.
Another concern is the fact that remedial regulation would shift some
of the antitrust oversight from the auspices of the Sherman Act to that of
the Copyright Act; or, from Title 15 to Title 17. This opens competition
policy up to the potentially negative influences of lobbying. Copyright—
with its concentrated market power and disparate interests—is particularly
susceptible to the influence of lobbyists.
Further, by mandating statutory licensing, remedial regulation
forecloses the opportunity for a true market to develop. Without a real
market, it is difficult to know whether the statutory rates set are
economically efficient. This concern may be mitigated, however, by the
uniform application of the rate across all parties.

258. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 218 at 687.
259. See id. at 688 (While “[r]egulatory agencies and even Congress cannot normally
prevent gaming ex ante . . . some level of antitrust enforcement . . . provides a necessary
check on behavior like product hopping that has no purpose but to exclude competition.”)
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In his classic work on organizational discontent, Albert Hirschman
describes a dichotomy of reactions from an unsatisfied player: The entity
can either continue as a member and voice its complaints, or it can exit the
organization and do business elsewhere.260 In the absence of sufficient
competition, a remedial regulatory regime removes the exit option. This
leaves disgruntled publishers to use their voices within ASCAP (or other
designated collective), and/or under the compulsory license, where they
may be able to wield their considerable market power to unfair advantage.
Part II.C.2 supra described the advantages of private ordering,
including the ability to achieve a higher royalty rate, to negotiate licenses
tailored to a particular piece of content and use, and to enjoy increased
flexibility to respond to changes in technology and consumer preferences.
It follows that another downside to remedial regulation is that it makes
private ordering and the benefits it brings more difficult, time-consuming,
and costly. In some instances, it may discourage private deal making
altogether. This cost is arguably offset, however, by the societal gains from
the elimination of anticompetitive behavior. Importantly, private ordering
is not eliminated, but rather regulated. Abuses are checked, and access to
content for all comers—established firms and prospective entrants alike—
is ensured.
In addition, the remedial regulation model utilizes an existing
regulatory agency, the CRB, for rate setting. To the extent that the
existence of, and exercise of rate-setting authority by, the CRB poses
separation of power issues, so too would a remedial regulation scheme that
assigns rate setting to that agency.261 Whether the CRB’s functions should
be moved to the executive branch, or vested elsewhere, however, is outside
the scope of this Article, and not specific, nor limited, to the remedial
regulation model.

260. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
261. Writing on administrative agencies generally, Professor Jody Freeman has
summarized the concern this way:
The combination of executive, legislative, and adjudicative functions in
administrative agencies appears to violate the separation of powers
principles embodied in the Constitution. Worse yet, despite their
considerable discretionary power to impact individual liberty and
property rights, allocate benefits and burdens, and shape virtually every
sector of the economy, agencies are not directly accountable to the
electorate.
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545–46 (2000).
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, regulatory price setting of the
sort advocated herein “has been plagued by complicated valuation,
allocation and second-best pricing problems that have bordered on
insurmountable.”262 Further, as noted in prior works, the default nature of
compulsory licenses makes the set rates sticky, and parties may come to
feel entitled to the regulatory rate regardless of its efficiency or
appropriateness.263 But regulatory price setting is already status quo for the
music licensing industry, such that its further encouragement does not
worsen the situation therein. To the contrary, to the extent that remedial
regulation can work to eliminate anticompetitive behavior, its benefits may
well outweigh any costs. If the model works—i.e., if it indeed discourages
consolidation of market power and entities’ petitions for private ordering
are granted—the market will eventually move away from regulatory price
setting altogether.
4. Advantages
The most obvious advantage of the remedial regulation model is that it
discourages anticompetitive behavior. The possibility of private ordering is
also preserved, so long as some do not reap its advantages at the expense of
others. Importantly, remedial regulation maintains a point of access for
content by leaving existing statutory licenses and a collective in place.
The additional costs borne by a party wishing to petition for private
ordering are justified by the potential upside of private licensing over
licensing under the statute, and are further excused by the optional nature
of petition: No one has to petition, and the statutory license is always
available as a point of access. Utilizing the FTC for regulatory review
makes further use of an existing regulatory body readily possessed of all
necessary authority for so doing. Review of petitions for circumvention can
also help to further inform the reviewing agency of current market
conditions. This information can lead to better merger reviews in the future.
The remedial regulation model is cost-effective in that it requires only
minimal statutory amendment to remove the non-mandatory default from
existing statutory licenses. The establishment of a new compulsory license
for public performance rights likewise imposes minimal legislative burden
as it models itself after the existing compulsory license for digital public
262. Christopher S. Yoo, The Economics of Network Access, 28 ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS 5 (2003). In the music context specifically, the history of webcasting royalty
determinations is arguably an unmitigated disaster. See DiCola & Sag, supra note 31
(suggesting the problems owe to flawed institutional design).
263. See García, supra note 15 at 1157–59.

254

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:1

performance of sound recordings, including the designation of a sole
collective—quite possibly one already in existence—for royalties
administration.
In the long-term, implementing a penalty default regulatory scheme
will encourage innovation by ensuring a competitive environment in which
new entrants are not discouraged from starting new services by the threat
that their success might be punished with rate coercion. In essence, the
remedial regulation model calls for a policy of facilitating the emergence
and continuation of rival content providers and distributors. Where a
robust number of providers cannot exist—owing to market conditions or
otherwise—the remedial regulation model ensures all players face the same
market conditions. As detailed in previous work, private ordering offers a
number of benefits over the statutory regime, but a statutory rate is still
better overall than an artificial “market” rate imposed by a single dominant
firm.264
The remedial regulation model’s use of mandatory statutory licenses
also works to ensure payment to artists. For example, the statutory license
for sound recordings contains a section calling for mandatory distribution
of royalties to artists.265 Section 114(g)(2) mandates a 50/50 split of
incoming royalties between the creator herself and the intermediary to
whom the copyright is assigned:


50% of receipts shall be paid to the copyright owner;



2.5% of receipts shall be deposited in an escrow account
for distribution to non-featured musicians;



2.5% of receipts shall be deposited in an escrow account
for non-featured vocalists; and



45% of receipts shall be paid to the featured recording
artist on the sound recording.266

Such assurances for artists aren’t limited to statutory licenses. Article
XVII(1)(c) of ASCAP’s Articles of Association likewise specifies the
distribution of royalties as “one-half thereof to be distributed among the
‘Music Publisher’ members, and one-half among the ‘Composer and

264. See generally García, supra note 15 (discussing the potential for manipulation of
“market” rates).
265. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g) (2012).
266. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)
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Author’ members, respectively.”267 Article XX, Section 4 further notes that
“[t]he royalties, or the right to participate in the royalties, and the rights of
the members in the Society, shall not be sold or otherwise disposed
of . . . .”268 When either § 114, or ASCAP (or both) is circumvented, so
too is this guaranteed payment to the artist, who becomes subject to
whatever portion their contract with the intermediary allows for (which, in
the case of many songwriters, is nothing).
Remedial regulation’s newly established compulsory license for the
public performance of musical compositions could offer similar payment
guarantees that cannot be circumvented unless and until a successful
petition is filed. Even then, a minor statutory amendment could dictate
that the artist protection portions are not circumventable.269 These artist
protections can be made inalienable, such that where a firm successfully
petitions circumvention by a showing of sufficient competition, the artist
distribution portion of the circumvented statutory license remains in force.
This comports with legislative intent in setting up these protections in
the first place: “The Committee intends the language of section 114(g) to
ensure that a fair share of the digital sound recording performance
royalties goes to the performers according to the terms of their
contracts.”270 According to Representative Conyers, this provision was
adopted to “ensure[] that musicians, vocalists, and artists receive their
royalties from digital music directly from the collection agent instead of
through other intermediaries.”271 The concern is obvious: In the absence of
statutory protection for those musicians, vocalists, and artists, the
intermediary record labels and music publishers might cut them out of
their share of royalties, as indeed has been the case in recent deals.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite the existence of more content now than ever before, there are
far fewer legal distribution and licensing channels for that content. The
dearth of competition in the licensing space is bad for users, artists, and
267. AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, AND PUBLISHERS, ARTICLES OF
ASSOCIATION OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, AND PUBLISHERS 19–20
(2002), http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/members/governing-documents/articles
-of-association.pdf [http://perma.cc/S54Q-CE4N].
268. Id. at 22.
269. See García, supra note 13, at 8 (proposing “a fidelity clause requiring parties who
circumvent the compulsory license to adhere to the statutorily mandated distributions in
order to obviate circumvention of statutory protections for non-parties”).
270. H.R. Res. No. 104-274, at 24 (1995).
271. 148 Cong. Rec. H7047 (2002) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
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innovators alike. By recognizing the value of private ordering in content
licensing and aiming to facilitate it when competition is robust, remedial
regulation works to maintain and encourage competition where antitrust
law does not.
The question of how to best manage emerging technologies and the
challenges they present has never been more pressing. The debate around
net neutrality, for example, is essentially a debate about whether antitrust
law or regulation is the better means of ensuring competition in the
broadband Internet space. Some lawmakers have argued that “vigorous
application of the antitrust laws can prevent dominant Internet service
providers (ISPs) from discriminating against competitors’ content or
engaging in anticompetitive pricing practices.”272
Others have pointed out that application of antitrust laws to ISPs
requires an expansive interpretation of antitrust’s jurisdiction. These critics
have expressed concern that antitrust, unlike regulation, “does not address
the non-economic goals of net neutrality, including the protection of free
speech and political debate.”273 Remedial regulation may well prove a
sustainable option for the maintenance of competition among Internet
service providers.
Acknowledging the potential for remedial regulation to maintain and
encourage competition in industries, like music licensing, where antitrust
has failed is only a starting point. Recognition of regulation as a tool for
checking anticompetitive behavior offers lawmakers a means of ensuring
continued growth and innovation in high tech sectors that have proven
resistant to traditional antitrust enforcement. By shifting the burden of
maintaining competition to the firms that wish to get out from under
regulation, remedial regulation harnesses the power of private industry in
order to serve public goals.

272. Net Neutrality: Is Antitrust Law More Effective Than Regulation in Protecting
Consumers and Innovation?, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman House Judiciary Committee), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings
?Id=CCF704C2-E445-4D9A-8B84-26F6B9A59CC6&Statement_id=4CB6551B-8469
-48C7-A155-8F62D9D172A6 [http://perma.cc/VT76-QDVL].
273. Net Neutrality: Is Antitrust Law More Effective Than Regulation in Protecting
Consumers and Innovation?, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Ranking Member John
Conyers, Jr.), http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/opening-statement/ranking-member
-conyers-statement-net-neutrality-hearing [http://perma.cc/YB74-DNJG].
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APPENDIX
Music Copyrights Reference Grid
Song
Copyright #1:
Publishing Right
(on underlying
musical
composition;
these rights
originally vest
with the
songwriter, and
are subsequently
usually assigned
to a publishing
company)
Royalty #1(a):
Mechanical
Royalty (payable
to copyright
holder—usually a
music
publisher—for
music sales, both
physical & digital
copies; the
licensee is usually
a record label)

These rights are
predominantly
administered by
the Harry Fox
Agency

Royalty #1(b):
Performance Royalty
(payable to copyright
holder—usually a music
publisher—for song
plays, both analog and
digital transmissions;
the licensee is usually a
radio station,
restaurant, or retail
store)

These rights are
predominantly
administered by
collectives
(ASCAP, BMI,
SESAC)

Copyright #2: Sound
Recording Right (on
sound recording of a
song; typically, these
rights originally vest
with the recording
artist & are later
assigned to a record
label, or they may be
assigned up front as
part of a work-forhire contract)

Royalty #2(a):
Master
Royalty
(potentially
payable to
artist for music
sales, both
physical &
digital,
existence and
amount
dependent
upon terms of
artist's contract
with record
label)

These royalties
are licensed by
private
contract
between label
and artist
(label, as
copyright
holder, takes
cut from sales
price)

Royalty #2(b):
Digital
Performance
Royalty (payable to
copyright holder—
usually a record
label—for song
plays, only for
digital
transmissions; the
licensee is usually
an Internet radio
service.) There is
no analog
performance right
for sound
recordings.

These rights are
licensed by statute
(17 USC § 114)
and are
administered
exclusively by
SoundExchange,
a collective
designated by the
statute
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